Edward Lu v. Saun D. Jackson

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
EDWARD LU,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
SAUN D. JACKSON,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE; JAMES
HERINGTON; DOES, 1 through 10,
Defendants.
No. 22-55457
D.C. No.
5:20-cv-01062-CBM-SHK
MEMORANDUM*
EDWARD LU,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE; SAUN D.
JACKSON; DOES, 1 through 10,
Defendants,
and
No. 22-55683
D.C. No.
5:20-cv-01062-CBM-SHK
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
FILED
JUL 26 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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JAMES HERINGTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Consuelo B. Marshall, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted July 14, 2023
Pasadena, California
Before: SANCHEZ and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges, and JACKSON,** District
Judge.
Defendant Deputies Saun Jackson and James Herington appeal the district
court’s denials of their motions for summary judgment on Edward Lu’s (“Lu’s”)
excessive force claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We “review orders denying
qualified immunity under the collateral order exception to finality.” Ballou v.
McElvain, 29 F.4th 413, 421 (9th Cir. 2022). “On interlocutory appeal, we review
de novo a district court’s denial of qualified immunity and view the facts in the
light most favorable to [the nonmoving party].” Estate of Aguirre v. Cnty. of
Riverside, 29 F.4th 624, 627 (9th Cir. 2022). The deputies are not entitled to
qualified immunity if their “conduct (1) violated a constitutional right that (2) was
clearly established at the time of the violation.” Ballou, 29 F.4th at 421.
** The Honorable Brian A. Jackson, United States District Judge for the
Middle District of Louisiana, sitting by designation.

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1. We reverse the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to the
Defendants for Lu’s claim that the deputies used excessive force by pointing their
guns at him during the execution of a valid search warrant. Defendants arrived at
Lu’s residence to execute a search warrant for evidence of marijuana cultivation
and weapons. Defendants, along with other deputies, pointed their guns at Lu from
the moment he exited his house until the deputies were able to put him in
handcuffs and pat him down.
First, Defendants did not violate Lu’s constitutional rights because pointing
guns at Lu was reasonable force. “Determining whether the force used to effect a
particular seizure is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful
balancing of ‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth
Amendment interests’ against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.”
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471
U.S. 1, 8 (1985)). It was not unreasonable for the deputies to point their guns at Lu
until he was handcuffed. While Lu was calm and compliant, the deputies were
executing a felony search warrant for drugs and firearms, which “is the kind of
transaction that may give rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts to conceal or
destroy evidence.” Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 703 (1981). Defendants’
interests in ensuring officer safety and facilitating an orderly search outweigh the
intrusion on Lu’s rights.

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Second, even assuming a constitutional violation, there was no clearly
established law at the time of the incident that would have alerted the deputies that
pointing a gun in these circumstances violates the Fourth Amendment. In denying
qualified immunity, the district court relied on Robinson v. Solano County, 278
F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002). But Robinson is distinguishable. There, the officers
were responding to a dispatch reporting a misdemeanor. Id. at 1014. The only
factor favoring a use of force in Robinson was that Robinson had earlier been
armed with a shotgun. Id. Here, the deputies were executing a valid felony search
warrant for marijuana cultivation and weapons. At the time of the incident, it was
not clearly established that while executing a felony search warrant for drugs and
weapons, briefly pointing guns at a suspect until the deputies could handcuff him
constituted excessive force.
2. We also reverse the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to the
Defendants for Lu’s claim that the deputies’ use of properly applied handcuffs was
an unreasonable seizure. “[A] warrant to search for contraband founded on
probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the
occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted.” Summers, 452 U.S.
at 705. The “safety risk inherent in executing a search warrant for weapons [is]
sufficient to justify the use of handcuffs.” Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 100
(2005). Therefore, there was no constitutional violation.

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REVERSED.

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