Elmer Oneleo Perez-Chamale v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ELMER ONELEO PEREZ-CHAMALE,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 22-412
Agency No.
A213-082-812
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted July 20, 2023**
San Francisco, California
Before: SILER,*** WARDLAW, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Elmer Oneleo Perez-Chamale, a citizen of Guatemala, petitions this court
to review a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying him
asylum and withholding of removal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252. We deny the petition for review.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, United States Circuit Judge for the
Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
FILED
JUL 24 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 22-412
We review for substantial evidence the BIA’s factual finding that a
purported particular social group (PSG) lacks social distinction within a society,
as well as its factual finding that a petitioner’s persecution lacks a nexus to a
protected ground. See Macedo Templos v. Wilkinson, 987 F.3d 877, 882–83 (9th
Cir. 2021). Under the substantial-evidence standard, “administrative findings of
fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to
conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Perez-
Chamale’s purported PSG of “business owners” lacks social distinction within
Guatemalan society. In Macedo Templos, our court affirmed the BIA’s rejection
of the similar purported PSG of “wealthy business owners” after concluding that
“[t]he record does not include evidence that Mexican society perceives wealthy
business owners as a distinct group.” 987 F.3d at 882. Perez-Chamale identifies
no evidence in the record here that would compel the opposite conclusion as to
“business owners” in Guatemalan society.
2. Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s finding that no nexus
existed between Perez-Chamale’s past persecution and his political opinion. See
Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 357–61 (9th Cir. 2017) (nexus
requirement); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (asylum); id. § 1231(b)(3)(C)
(withholding of removal). The record establishes that gang members extorted
Perez-Chamale because of his ability to pay, not because of his connection to the
mayor. See Macedo Templos, 987 F.3d at 883 (affirming a no-nexus finding

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because “[t]he evidence proves that [the petitioner’s persecutors] . . . will target
anyone they believe can pay, regardless of . . . background”). Perez-Chamale
testified that he owned “three . . . [m]otorcycle taxis” and that the gang members
extorted him “[b]ecause of the money that [he] would earn.” He further testified
that the gang members extorted “a lot of other individuals,” including “all owners
of motorcycle taxis.” When asked whether the gang members “indicated that
they were threatening [him] due to any type of political belief,” he responded that
“[t]hey never indicated that” but instead “always indicated [the extortion] was
because of the moto[rcycle] taxis that [he] had.” And when asked whether the
gang members had any other motivation besides economic gain, Perez-Chamale
responded: “No. Basically, it was just for my economic stability.”1
3. Remand is not needed in light of Matter of A-B-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 307
(A.G. 2021). Perez-Chamale’s opening brief argues that decision changed the
analysis of “claims that revolve[] around domestic violence” against women, but
Perez-Chamale asserts he was extorted based on his family membership, status
as a business owner, and political opinion.
The petition for review is DENIED.
1 To the extent Perez-Chamale argues that the extortion he suffered
had a nexus to the PSG of his family, that argument also fails. He failed to
exhaust that argument before the BIA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). And in any
event, the BIA’s determination that the gang members were motivated solely by
“financial gain” precludes any nexus to Perez-Chamale’s family-based PSG.

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