Ravi Salhotra v. Simpson Strong-Tie Company, Inc.

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RAVI SALHOTRA, et al.
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
SIMPSON STRONG-TIE COMPANY,
INC., et al.,
Defendant-Appellees.
No. 22-15800
D.C. No. 3:19-cv-07901-TSH
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Honorable Thomas S. Hixson, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted June 5, 2023
San Francisco, California
Before: MILLER and KOH, Circuit Judges, and MOLLOY,** District Judge.
Dissent by Judge MILLER.
Appellants Ravi Salhotra and the putative class sued Appellees Simpson
Strong-Tie Company Inc. and Simpson Manufacturing Company (“Simpson”),
alleging that an inherent defect in Simpson’s connector products cause them to
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The Honorable Donald W. Molloy, United States District Judge for
the District of Montana, sitting by designation.
FILED
JUL 10 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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prematurely corrode and that a failure to disclose this defect breached Simpson’s
express warranty. Simpson counters that class treatment is not appropriate because
Appellants have not established an inherent design defect, that this case is about
individual issues for induvial homeowners, and that if any damage occurred, it was
caused by factors outside of Simpson’s control. The district court excluded the
declaration of Appellants’ key expert, Dr. Paul Brown, and denied their motion for
class certification. Appellants appeal. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, and we reverse and remand.
We “review the district court’s exclusion of [an] expert opinion and the
resulting denial of class certification for an abuse of discretion.” Grodzitsky v. Am.
Honda Motor Co., 957 F.3d 979, 984 (9th Cir. 2020). Consistent with the standard
set forth in Daubert, the district court has a duty as a gatekeeper to “ensure that all
admitted expert testimony is both relevant and reliable.” Id. (quoting Wendell v.
GlaxoSmithKline LLC, 858 F.3d 1227, 1232 (9th Cir. 2017)); see Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). “Scientific evidence is reliable if
the principles and methodology used by an expert are grounded in the methods of
science.” Wendell v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC, 858 F.3d 1227, 1232 (9th Cir. 2017)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Indicia of reliability may also be found when
“an expert . . . draw[s] a conclusion from a set of observations based on extensive

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and specialized experience.” Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 156
(1999).
Dr. Brown’s reliance on American Concrete Institute standards, personal
observations based on his extensive experience working in the field of metal
corrosion in concrete, and testing of specific Simpson products to reach his
opinions demonstrate his reliability under Daubert. Simpson objects to these
methodologies; however, their objections go to the weight of the evidence, not its
admissibility. See Grodzitsky, 957 F.3d at 984–85 (“The focus of the district
court’s analysis must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the
conclusions that they generate.” (quoting Wendell, 858 F.3d at 1232)); Primiano v.
Cook, 598 F.3d 558, 564 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The test under Daubert is not the
correctness of the expert’s conclusions but the soundness of his methodology.”
(quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1318 (9th Cir.
1995))). Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion in excluding Dr.
Brown’s opinions under Daubert. And because the denial of class certification
rested so heavily on the exclusion of Dr. Brown’s testimony, that decision must
also be reconsidered by the district court.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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Salhotra v. Simpson Strong-Tie Co., Inc., No. 22-15800
MILLER, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Paul Brown’s
declaration or in denying the motion for class certification.
Dr. Brown relied on the standards of the American Concrete Institute. No
one disputes that those standards are grounded in “scientifically valid principles,”
but Dr. Brown did not explain how they are relevant to this case. Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993). ACI 318 applies to rebar
and structural reinforcement pieces, so by its terms it is inapplicable to the
products at issue. ACI 222 does apply to the products, but it states that “additional
protective measures” can compensate for inadequate concrete cover, and it
suggests that, for at least some products, “consideration should be given to the use
of galvanized . . . steel.” That is precisely what Simpson did. On its face, therefore,
ACI 222 does not suggest that there is anything defective about the products. In his
declaration, Dr. Brown pointed to a comment of a panelist at a 2003 Concrete
Industry Association meeting, who opined that the zinc coating on galvanized steel
“is a thin sacrificial coating that will quickly be dissolved/consumed in acidic
environments.” Even assuming that a 20-year-old comment by a single, unnamed
panelist should be taken to reflect “scientifically valid principles,” Dr. Brown did
FILED
JUL 10 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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not show that the products were exposed to an acidic environment, so the comment
is not relevant to any issue in the case.
To be fair, Dr. Brown did explain how the geometry of the products could
lead to high-permeability regions in the concrete in which they are embedded;
some evidence in the record suggests that corrosive salts in soil may seep through
such concrete; and other evidence in the record suggests that galvanization does
not provide complete protection against such corrosive salts. Arguably, those
pieces of evidence could be linked together to form a theory that the products are
defective because they are made from galvanized steel. But Dr. Brown did not
connect the dots, let alone explain a scientific methodology that would justify
connecting them.
Perhaps the district court could have been more generous in interpreting Dr.
Brown’s declaration, but we review a district court’s decision to exclude expert
testimony for abuse of discretion. See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136,
143 (1997). Under that standard, we must uphold the decision “unless the ruling is
manifestly erroneous.” Id. at 142 (quoting Spring Co. v. Edgar, 99 U.S. 645, 658
(1879)). In my view, plaintiffs have not made such a showing. And without Dr.
Brown’s declaration, plaintiffs did not establish that their claims are susceptible to
common proof. I would therefore affirm the denial of class certification.

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