Heeja Jeong v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
HEEJA JEONG,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 21-696
Agency No.
A203-113-439
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted June 9, 2023**
Honolulu, Hawaii
Before: BADE, BUMATAY, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.
Heeja Jeong (“Jeong”), a native and citizen of the Republic of Korea,
petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision
affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) determination that she is removable
under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(l)(A) and 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i). This Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition for review.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JUN 21 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 21-696
1. Jeong fails to demonstrate that her 2016 airport interview lacked adequate
safeguards. The 2016 interview was conducted under oath, transcribed, and
every page contains the date of the interview along with signatures from the
interviewing officer and Jeong. Jeong requested that the interview be conducted
in English and the transcript contains no indication that Jeong was tired,
confused, or reluctant to answer any questions. See Matter of J-C-H-F-, 27 I. &
N. Dec. 211, 214 (BIA 2018). Although the last page of the sworn statement
contains an incorrect date, Jeong fails to explain how this error renders the
entire interview unreliable under the totality of the circumstances. In addition,
the government made a reasonable effort to obtain the interviewing officer who
was on medical leave, and Jeong has not demonstrated that the failure to
procure the signing witness was prejudicial.
2. A noncitizen is statutorily removable if “by fraud or willfully
misrepresenting a material fact,” the noncitizen “seeks to procure (or has sought
to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the
United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(l)(A). A
statutory bar, unlike a discretionary factor, renders a noncitizen removable even
after adjustment of status. See Choe v. INS, 11 F.3d 925 (9th Cir. 1993).
Jeong admitted during the 2016 airport interview that she intended to
marry a United States citizen and adjust status when she entered the United
States on July 8, 2010, but “told the officer [she] was here for vacation only.”
She agreed that she “knowingly and willfully misrepresented [her] true intent . .

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3 21-696
. in order to gain admission.” Substantial evidence therefore supports the
agency’s conclusion that Jeong sought to procure admission into the United
States through willful misrepresentation. Materiality is a legal question we
review de novo. See Forbes v. INS, 48 F.3d 439, 442 (9th Cir. 1995). We find
Jeong’s misrepresentation of her intent to immigrate material because it “had a
natural tendency to influence the decisions” of immigration officials. Id. at 443.
Jeong’s reliance on a trio of BIA cases is unavailing. All three cases
dealt with the question of whether preconceived intent could serve as a
discretionary factor at the adjustment of status stage. See Matter of Cavazos, 17
I. & N. Dec. 215, 217 (BIA 1980); Matter of Ibrahim, 18 I. & N. Dec. 55, 56
(BIA 1981); Matter of Battista, 19 I. & N. Dec. 484, 485 (BIA 1987). This case
concerns a statutory bar at the post-adjustment of status stage.1
PETITION DENIED.
1 In Choe, we held that a noncitizen who enters the United States as a visitor and
later adjusts status to permanent resident cannot be deported on the basis that
the person’s preconceived intent to remain rendered their nonimmigrant visa
invalid under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(20) (current version 8 U.S.C. § 1182(7)(A)(i)).
See 11 F.3d at 930. We made clear that our holding would not prohibit an
alien’s deportation “for other immigration violations—violations that are
statutory bars to adjustment of status in the first place,” such as willful
misrepresentation of a material fact at the time of entry. Id.

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