Lili He v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LILI HE,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 22-1032
Agency No.
A089-479-987
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted June 6, 2023**
Honolulu, Hawaii
Before: BADE, BUMATAY, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Lili He (“He”), a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of
China, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”)
denial of her motion to reopen her removal proceedings. We have jurisdiction
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the petition.
Motions to reopen proceedings must be filed within 90 days of the final
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JUN 9 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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administrative order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(C)(7)(c)(i). But there is no
deadline where the motion to reopen is “based on changed country conditions
arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not
available and would not have been discovered or presented” during previous
proceedings. Id. § 1229a(C)(7)(c)(ii) (emphasis added).
He contends her motion to reopen should have been granted because
since her initial removal proceedings she has had three children. But this court
has already held that “the birth of children outside the country of origin is a
change in personal circumstances that is not sufficient to establish changed
circumstances in the country of origin within the regulatory exception to late-
filed or successive motions to reopen.” He v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1128, 1132
(9th Cir. 2007). Consequently, He’s contention that the BIA erred in denying
her motion to reopen based on the change in her personal circumstances is
foreclosed by precedent.
He next argues that she submitted country conditions evidence that
demonstrates if she is returned to China she will face persecution for being (1) a
Christian, (2) a Chinese citizen who violated China’s “birth control policy,” (3)
a single mother with children born outside a marital relationship, and (4) a
returning citizen who fled with the help of smugglers. Substantial evidence
supports the BIA’s conclusion that He’s country conditions evidence “does not
adequately show that there has been a change in conditions in China.” The
record reflects that China has been listed as a “Country of Particular Concern”

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since 1999 based on its “particularly severe violations of religious freedom.”
And that China’s birth-control policies have not materially changed. To the
extent He relies on the creation of a “social scoring system,” this claim was not
presented to the BIA and therefore the panel lacks jurisdiction to consider it.
See, e.g., Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 2004).
Finally, He peremptorily contends she was deprived of due process. But
He fails to identify any act that rendered her proceedings “fundamentally
unfair” or explain how she was prejudiced by any such acts. See, e.g., Ibarra-
Flores v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 614, 620–21 (9th Cir. 2006) (explaining an
agency’s decision will be reversed on due process grounds only if the alien
shows that (1) she was “prevented from reasonably presenting [her] case” and
(2) “the alien demonstrates prejudice, which means that the outcome of the
proceeding may have been affected by the alleged violation” (quotation
omitted)).
PETITION DENIED.

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