Jesus Villegas; v. City of Los Angeles;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JESUS VILLEGAS; et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
CITY OF LOS ANGELES; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 21-56376
D.C. No.
2:20-cv-07469-SB-JC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Stanley Blumenfeld, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 5, 2023**
Pasadena, California
Before: WALLACE and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and FITZWATER,*** District
Judge.
FILED
JUN 8 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for the
Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.

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Plaintiffs Jesus Villegas, Lucio Villegas, Karla Jinez, Jan Breidenbach, and Dan
Stormer (“Plaintiffs”) appeal from the district court’s denial of their Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law brought after a jury
returned a verdict in favor of Defendants City of Los Angeles, City of Los Angeles
Police Department, Former Police Chief Michael Moore, and Officers Jose Diaz,
Miguel Diaz, Kevin Wong, and Victor Figueroa (“Defendants”) on Plaintiffs’ 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the individual defendants, § 1983 municipal liability
claim, and California Bane Act claim brought pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code §§ 52 and
52.1.1 All of Plaintiffs’ claims are based on allegations that Plaintiffs’ Fourth
Amendment rights were violated when law enforcement entered their residence at
approximately 1:30 a.m. after receiving a static 911 call from the residence and
purportedly suspecting an emergency. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
and, reviewing de novo, Lakeside-Scott v. Multnomah Cnty., 556 F.3d 797, 802 (9th
Cir. 2009), we affirm.
1 Because Plaintiffs did not move for Rule 50(b) judgment as a matter of law on
their municipal liability or California Bane Act claims, we will limit our discussion to
Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against the individual defendants. See, e.g., Steam Press
Holdings, Inc. v. Hawaii Teamsters, Allied Workers Union, Loc. 996, 302 F.3d 998,
1005 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing In re E.R. Fegert, Inc., 887 F.2d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1989))
(“[A]s a general rule courts of this circuit will not consider arguments on appeal that
were not properly raised at the lower court level . . . .”).
2

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1. The district court properly denied Plaintiffs’ Rule 50(b) motion because the
jury’s verdict was based on a reasonable interpretation of the evidence. The jury was
presented evidence that law enforcement received a static 911 call at approximately
1:00 a.m., law enforcement found the front door of the residence to be unlocked, and,
despite the fact that two cars were parked outside the residence, no one came to the
door when law enforcement rang the doorbell three times and announced their
presence through the open front door. Based on this evidence, a reasonable jury could
have found that the emergency aid exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement permitted law enforcement’s warrantless entry into Plaintiffs’ residence.
See United States v. Snipe, 515 F.3d 947, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2008); Martin v. City of
Oceanside, 360 F.3d 1078, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 2004). Therefore, because a reasonable
jury could have found that Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights were not violated, the
district court properly denied Plaintiffs’ Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter
of law.
AFFIRMED.
3

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