CASANDRA PASTORA, Deceased, by v. County of San Bernardino, a public entity

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CASANDRA PASTORA, Deceased, by and
through her Successor in interest, Saeed
Toghraie; SAEED TOGHRAIE,
individually,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO, a
public entity; JOHN MCMAHON,
individually, and in his official capacity;
SHANNON D. DICUS, in his
individual/official capacity; VICTOR
MORENO, in his individual/official
capacity; DOES, 1-10, individually, jointly,
and severally,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 22-55617
D.C. No. 5:21-cv-01410-JGB-SP
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Jesus G. Bernal, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 7, 2023
Pasadena, California
Before: WATFORD and COLLINS, Circuit Judges, and MURPHY,** District
Judge.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as
provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The Honorable Stephen Joseph Murphy III, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.
FILED
MAY 31 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 10 --

2
Plaintiff-appellant Saaed Toghraie appeals from the district court’s judgment
dismissing a civil action brought upon the death of Toghraie’s daughter, Casandra
Pastora, who passed away after severely injuring herself in a detention facility
operated by the County of San Bernardino. We affirm in part, reverse in part,
vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.
I
Casandra Pastora was diagnosed with schizophrenia at the age of 21. She
treated her condition with medication. While in college studying to become a
special education teacher, Pastora became pregnant.
Concerned about the effects of her schizophrenia medication on the baby,
Pastora stopped taking her medication. She then had a mental breakdown that
resulted in her father, Saeed Toghraie, calling 911. After San Bernardino County
Sheriff’s deputies arrived, Toghraie explained that Pastora “had been diagnosed
with schizophrenia but stopped taking her medication because she was pregnant.”
Deputies ultimately arrested Pastora1 and took her to a County jail. A County
deputy informed Toghraie that Pastora had been placed in a “safe room” at the jail
so that “she could not harm herself.” Nonetheless, while in jail, Pastora managed
to attempt suicide. As a result, she sustained substantial brain damage, lost her
baby, and died a few days later.
1 The crime of arrest is not identified in the operative complaint.

-- 2 of 10 --

3
Toghraie sued the County of San Bernardino, as well as various County
agents. The operative complaint asserts five causes of action: (1) a constitutional
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the provision of inadequate conditions of
confinement and medical care; (2) a constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for deprivation of the fundamental right to familial relationships; (3) a Monell
claim against the County of San Bernardino for the two constitutional violations
identified above; (4) a violation of California Civil Code § 52.1, also known as the
“Bane Act”; and (5) a California state-law claim for negligence leading to
wrongful death. The complaint identified three sets of defendants: (1) the County
of San Bernardino; (2) three named County officers, all in supervisory positions
over detention facilities in the County; and (3) a set of “Doe defendants,” who
were as-yet unidentified “employees and agents” of the County responsible for
supervising and caring for Pastora while she was confined at the County jail.
The district court ultimately granted a motion to dismiss all claims against
all defendants with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Toghraie appeals.
II
We affirm the dismissal of all claims against the three named County
officers: (1) Sheriff-Coroner John McMahon; (2) County Undersheriff Shannon
Dicus; and (3) Captain Victor Moreno, head of the County’s Corrections Division.

-- 3 of 10 --

4
Toghraie’s operative complaint does not “plead[] factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference” that any of these defendants are “liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation
omitted).
We begin with the state-law negligence claim. “To prevail in an action for
negligence [under California law], the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, that the defendant breached that duty, and
that the breach proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries.” John B. v. Superior
Ct., 137 P.3d 153, 159 (Cal. 2006) (citation omitted). The operative complaint
contains no non-conclusory allegations as to any of these three named defendants
with respect to the issues of breach of duty or causation of injury. As such, the
district court properly dismissed that claim as to these defendants. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 679.
Toghraie’s remaining claims against these three named defendants all
require a showing of fault that is more culpable than mere negligence. See
Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124–25 (9th Cir. 2018) (stating that
a showing of “deliberate indifference” amounting to “reckless disregard” is
necessary to prevail on claim for inadequate medical care under Fourteenth
Amendment (citation omitted)); Lemire v. California Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 726
F.3d 1062, 1068, 1075 (9th Cir. 2013) (stating that a Fourteenth Amendment claim

-- 4 of 10 --

5
for deprivation of familial relationships requires a showing of official conduct that
is “deliberately indifferent” in a way that “shocks the conscience” (citation
omitted)); Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles, 137 Cal. Rptr. 3d 839, 846 (Ct. App.
2012) (holding that a Bane Act claim under California Civil Code § 52.1 requires a
showing of “threats, intimidation, or coercion”). Because the operative complaint
fails to state a claim against these named defendants for negligence, it necessarily
fails to state a claim under any of the other, more demanding theories of liability as
well. These three defendants were properly dismissed with prejudice.
III
We reverse the dismissal of Toghraie’s four claims against the Doe
defendants. See Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642–43 (9th Cir. 1980)
(holding that, where a complaint otherwise states a valid claim against specific, but
as-yet unidentified defendants, “the plaintiff should be given an opportunity
through discovery to identify the unknown defendants”).
Paragraph 91 of the operative complaint alleges that unknown Doe
defendants “verbally harass[ed] and assault[ed] MS. PASTORA while battering
her, to seek her compliance and submission to their threats and control.”
Paragraph 91 additionally alleges that the Doe defendants “further threatened,
harassed, and coerced MS. PASTORA by refusing to provide her with necessary
medical care when she cried, screamed, and yelled for immediate help after

-- 5 of 10 --

6
injuring herself, and while she continued to harm herself.”
Although the names of the particular County employees at issue have not yet
been identified, the substance of this factual allegation is not conclusory, and we
are thus required to assume it to be true for purposes of evaluating a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Telesaurus VPC, LLC v. Power, 623 F.3d 998,
1003 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). Taking the allegations in
Paragraph 91 as true, we conclude that they state a claim for relief against the
relevant Doe defendants under the four applicable claims in the complaint.
1. “Parents and children may assert Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
process claims if they are deprived of their liberty interest in the companionship
and society of their child or parent through official conduct,” but only if that
official conduct is “deliberately indifferent” in a way that “shocks the conscience.”
Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1075 (citation omitted). “[R]efusing to provide” a detainee
who is known to be pregnant and schizophrenic “with necessary medical care
when she cried, screamed, and yelled for immediate help after injuring herself,” in
addition to “verbally harassing” and “battering” her, is official conduct that is
“deliberately indifferent” and “shocks the conscience.” Id. (citation omitted).
2. “[T]he elements of a pretrial detainee’s medical care claim against an
individual defendant under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
are: (i) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions

-- 6 of 10 --

7
under which the plaintiff was confined; (ii) those conditions put the plaintiff at
substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (iii) the defendant did not take
reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official
in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved—
making the consequences of the defendant’s conduct obvious; and (iv) by not
taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injuries.” Gordon, 888
F.3d at 1125. “[R]efusing to provide” Pastora “with necessary medical care when
she cried, screamed, and yelled for immediate help after injuring herself,” after
which Pastora died, states a claim under this standard.
3. The allegations in paragraph 91 also support a plausible inference that the
Doe defendants “owed a duty to” Pastora as a vulnerable detainee, “breached that
duty,” and that “the breach proximately caused [Pastora’s] injuries,” as required to
state the elements of a claim for negligence under California law. John B., 137
P.3d at 159.2
4. “A defendant is liable under the Bane Act if he or she interfered with or
attempted to interfere with the plaintiff’s constitutional rights by the requisite
threats, intimidation, or coercion.” Julian v. Mission Cmty. Hosp., 218 Cal. Rptr.
3d 38, 69 (Ct. App. 2017) (simplified). “The essence of a Bane Act claim is that
2 California has chosen not to “exonerate[] a public employee,” as opposed to a
public entity, “from liability for injury proximately caused by his negligent or
wrongful act or omission” leading to certain prisoner-related injuries. CAL. GOV’T
CODE § 844.6(d) (emphasis added).

-- 7 of 10 --

8
the defendant, by the specified improper means (i.e., ‘threats, intimidation or
coercion’), tried to or did prevent the plaintiff from doing something he or she had
the right to do under the law or to force the plaintiff to do something that he or she
was not required to do under the law.” Austin B. v. Escondido Union Sch. Dist., 57
Cal. Rptr. 3d 454, 472 (Ct. App. 2007) (citation omitted). “[T]he Bane Act does
not require the ‘threat, intimidation or coercion’ element of the claim to be
transactionally independent from the constitutional violation alleged.”
Rodriguez v. County of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 802 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation
omitted). Here, the complaint’s allegations that the Doe defendants “verbally
harass[ed] and assault[ed] MS. PASTORA while battering her, to seek her
compliance and submission to [the Doe defendants’] threats and control,” gives
rise to a plausible inference that these defendants used “threats, intimidation, or
coercion” in accomplishing the adequately pleaded interference with Pastora’s
constitutional rights. Julian, 218 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 69.
IV
We vacate the dismissal of the Monell and negligence claims against the
County, as well as the dismissal of Toghraie’s claim for punitive damages.3
The district court dismissed Toghraie’s Monell claim solely on the ground
3 Toghraie does not contest the district court’s earlier dismissal of his Bane Act
claim against the County with prejudice, and the operative complaint does not
reallege a Bane Act claim against the County. Any challenge to the dismissal of
this claim against the County is therefore forfeited.

-- 8 of 10 --

9
that “a Monell claim cannot survive without an underlying constitutional
violation.” See Lockett v. County of Los Angeles, 977 F.3d 737, 741 (9th Cir.
2020). Having concluded that the operative complaint does, in fact, state
underlying constitutional claims against the Doe defendants, we must vacate the
district court’s dismissal of the Monell claim against the County.
The district court similarly dismissed Toghraie’s state-law claim for
negligence against the County on the ground that Toghraie had failed to plead facts
supporting an allegation that any defendant was “aware of a serious and obvious
medical condition requiring immediate care and that they failed to summon
immediate medical care.” The County is immune from liability for “[a]n injury to
any prisoner” under California Government Code § 844.6, unless, with certain
exceptions, one of its employees “knows or has reason to know that the prisoner is
in need of immediate medical care and he fails to take reasonable action to
summon such medical care,” CAL. GOV’T CODE § 845.6. Having concluded that
the allegations in Paragraph 91 suffice to plead that the Doe defendants knew or
had reason to know that Pastora was “in need of immediate medical care” and
“fail[ed] to take reasonable action to summon such medical care,” id., we vacate
the district court’s dismissal of the state-law negligence claim against the County.
Finally, the district court dismissed Toghraie’s request for punitive damages
solely on the ground that “no cause of action remains against Individual

-- 9 of 10 --

10
Defendants.” Having revived causes of action against the Doe defendants, we
vacate the dismissal of Toghraie’s request for punitive damages.
V
We accordingly AFFIRM the dismissal with prejudice of all claims against
defendants John McMahon, Shannon Dicus, and Victor Moreno. We REVERSE
the dismissal of Claims 1, 2, 4, and 5 against Does 1–10. We VACATE the
dismissal of Claims 3 and 5 against the County of San Bernardino, and we
VACATE the district court’s dismissal of Toghraie’s request for punitive damages.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, VACATED in part, and
REMANDED.

-- 10 of 10 --