Reyna Marquez Garcia v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
REYNA MARQUEZ GARCIA; ABIMAEL
EMIGDIO MARQUEZ; CARLOS
EMIGDIO MARQUEZ; JOSUE
MARQUEZ GARCIA,
Petitioners,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 22-688
Agency Nos.
A208-587-540
A208-587-541
A208-587-542
A208-587-543
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted May 19, 2023**
Phoenix, Arizona
Before: NGUYEN, COLLINS, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
Lead Petitioner Reyna Marquez Garcia; her adult son, Abimael Emigdio
Marquez; and her two minor children (collectively, “petitioners”) petition for
review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) adopting
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAY 23 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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and affirming the immigration judge’s (“IJ”) order denying asylum, withholding
of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We
have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Reviewing the agency’s factual
findings for substantial evidence, see Flores Molina v. Garland, 37 F.4th 626,
632 (9th Cir. 2022), we deny the petition for review.
The agency properly rejected petitioners’ applications for asylum and
withholding of removal.1 Substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding
that petitioners did not demonstrate an objectively reasonable fear of future
persecution because their claim is based only on generalized criminal violence
in Mexico and fails to establish an individualized risk of harm. Petitioners did
not establish an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution because they
did not suffer mistreatment in Mexico, did not identify any specific groups or
individuals that might harm them in the future, and acknowledged that their fear
of future harm is based on generalized violence in Mexico. See Singh v. INS,
134 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[T]o establish a well-founded fear,
petitioner cannot simply prove that there exists a generalized or random
possibility of persecution; she must show that she is at particular risk—that her
predicament is appreciably different from the dangers faced by her fellow
citizens.”) (cleaned up and citation omitted).
PETITION DENIED.
1 The IJ also denied petitioners’ CAT claim, but petitioners did not challenge
that determination before the BIA, nor do they challenge it in this court.

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