BENJAMIN WOODHOUSE, A Citizen of the United States, Resident of the U.S. Virgin Islands v. United States Government;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BENJAMIN WOODHOUSE, A Citizen of
the United States, Resident of the U.S. Virgin
Islands; HAVENSIGHT CAPITAL L.L.C., a
U.S. Virgin Islands corporation,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 22-55598
D.C. No. 2:22-cv-00079-RGK
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 16, 2023**
Before: BENNETT, MILLER, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.
Benjamin Woodhouse and Havensight Capital LLC appeal from the district
court’s judgment dismissing their claims under prefiling vexatious litigant orders.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAY 23 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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discretion. In re Fillbach, 223 F.3d 1089, 1090-91 (9th Cir. 2000). We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing plaintiffs’ claims
against Nike, Inc., Meta Platforms, Inc., and Gibson, Dunn, & Crutcher LLP
because plaintiffs’ complaint was within the scope of the district court’s prefiling
vexatious litigant orders, and plaintiffs failed to comply with the prefiling
requirements. See Weissman v. Quail Lodge, Inc., 179 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir.
1999) (“District courts have the inherent power to file restrictive pre-filing orders
against vexatious litigants with abusive and lengthy histories of litigation. Such
pre-filing orders may enjoin the litigant from filing further actions or papers unless
he or she first meets certain requirements . . . .” (citation omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by striking plaintiffs’ amended
complaints because plaintiffs did not seek and obtain leave of court to file an
amended complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (explaining that a party may
amend “only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave” when
it cannot amend as a matter of course under Rule 15(a)(1)); Ready Transp., Inc. v.
AAR Mfg., Inc., 627 F.3d 402, 403-04 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard of
review and explaining that a district court has inherent power to control its docket,
including power to strike items from the docket).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiffs’ requests
for entry of default because plaintiffs’ requests were frivolous. See Speiser,

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Krause & Madole P.C. v. Ortiz, 271 F.3d 884, 886 (9th Cir. 2001) (standard of
review).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
Plaintiffs’ motion to take judicial notice (Docket Entry No. 22) and motion
for sanctions (Docket Entry No. 31) are denied.
All pending requests in the briefing are denied.
AFFIRMED.

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