Kip Hartman v. Austin Knudsen; Marcia Boris

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KIP HARTMAN,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v.
AUSTIN KNUDSEN; MARCIA BORIS,
Respondents-Appellants.
No. 22-35694
D.C. No. 9:22-cv-00057-DLC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Dana L. Christensen, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 10, 2023
Seattle, Washington
Before: HAWKINS, W. FLETCHER, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
The State of Montana appeals the district court’s order granting Kip
Hartman’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on double
jeopardy grounds. “We review de novo a district court’s decision granting or
denying a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to [28 U.S.C.]
FILED
MAY 17 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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§ 2241,” Wilson v. Belleque, 554 F.3d 816, 828 (9th Cir. 2009), and we review “[a]
judicial determination of manifest necessity . . . for abuse of discretion,” United
States v. Chapman, 524 F.3d 1073, 1082 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
The district court did not err in granting Hartman’s petition for writ of
habeas corpus on double jeopardy grounds because the state trial court abused its
discretion in declaring a mistrial out of manifest necessity. The Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects “a defendant’s valued right to have his
trial completed by a particular tribunal.” Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689
(1949). While this right “must in some instances be subordinated to the public’s
interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments,” id., there must be a “high
degree” of necessity, referred to as “manifest necessity,” before a court may
conclude that a mistrial is appropriate over the objection of the defendant, Arizona
v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505–06 (1978). Courts may properly find manifest
necessity “to declare a mistrial if an impartial verdict cannot be reached, or if a
verdict of conviction could be reached but would have to be reversed on appeal due
to an obvious procedural error in the trial,” Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458,
464 (1973), or a mistrial is needed to “afford[] the prosecutor one full and fair
opportunity to present his evidence to an impartial jury,” Washington, 434 U.S. at
505.
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The trial court here did not identify any events giving rise to the high degree
of necessity for a mistrial that courts have previously recognized. There was no
obvious procedural error in the trial that would require reversal on appeal; the
record does not establish that Hartman’s counsel provided ineffective assistance of
counsel or that counsel had a conflict of interest with his client “that affected
counsel’s performance.” Mickens v.Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 171 (2002) (emphasis
removed). Nor was the declaration of a mistrial necessary to protect the State’s
right to a fair trial, since the prosecutor agreed to cooperate to streamline the
remainder of the trial. Instead, the trial court determined that declaring a mistrial
was necessary because it had set a limited amount of time for trial and declined,
based on docket management concerns, to extend this time frame for a period
sufficient to allow Hartman to exercise his Sixth Amendment right to testify on his
own behalf. Such time-management concerns do not rise to the high degree of
necessity required before depriving Hartman of his “valued right to have his trial
completed by a particular tribunal.” Wade, 336 U.S. at 689. Moreover, because
the trial court did not “consider[] plausible alternatives” to declaring a mistrial, the
trial court deserves little deference for its decision. Chapman, 524 F.3d at 1082.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in
declaring a mistrial, and the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a retrial of Hartman.
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AFFIRMED.
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