Juan Carlos Gonzalez Diaz v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JUAN CARLOS GONZALEZ DIAZ,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 21-70946
Agency No. A098-988-692
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted April 17, 2023**
Before: CLIFTON, R. NELSON, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.
Juan Carlos Gonzalez Diaz, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions pro
se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his
appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying his applications for asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
APR 25 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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(“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial
evidence the agency’s factual findings, including determinations regarding social
distinction. Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2020). We
review de novo the legal question of whether a particular social group is
cognizable, except to the extent that deference is owed to the BIA’s interpretation
of the governing statutes and regulations. Id. We deny the petition for review.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Gonzalez
Diaz failed to establish he was or would be persecuted on account of membership
in his proposed family-based particular social groups. See Ayala v. Holder, 640
F.3d 1095, 1097 (9th Cir. 2011) (even if membership in a particular social group is
established, an applicant must still show that “persecution was or will be on
account of his membership in such group”).
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Gonzalez
Diaz failed to establish his proposed returnee-based social group is socially
distinct. See Conde Quevedo, 947 F.3d at 1243 (absence of society-specific
evidence of social distinction). Thus, the BIA did not err in concluding that
Gonzalez Diaz did not establish membership in a cognizable particular social
group. See Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2016) (in order to
demonstrate membership in a particular social group, “[t]he applicant must
‘establish that the group is (1) composed of members who share a common

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immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct
within the society in question’” (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227,
237 (BIA 2014))).
We do not address Gonzalez Diaz’s contentions as to the asylum one-year
bar, whether the harm he suffered rises to the level of persecution, the cognizability
of the family-based particular social groups, and whether he could relocate because
the BIA did not deny relief on these grounds. See Santiago-Rodriguez v. Holder,
657 F.3d 820, 829 (9th Cir. 2011) (“In reviewing the decision of the BIA, we
consider only the grounds relied upon by that agency.” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT protection
because Gonzalez Diaz failed to show it is more likely than not he will be tortured
by or with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to El
Salvador. See Aden v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009).
The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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