Stephanie S. Taylor, for minor N.F; v. State of Washington Department of Juvenile Youth

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
STEPHANIE S. TAYLOR, for minor N.F; et
al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
STATE OF WASHINGTON
DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE YOUTH
AND FAMILY SERVICES, FAR and CPS
Department; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 21-36030
D.C. No. 2:19-cv-01869-RAJ
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Richard A. Jones, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 14, 2023**
Before: SILVERMAN, SUNG, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.
Stephanie S. Taylor and Sandra Brown appeal pro se from the district court’s
judgment dismissing for failure to comply with a court order their action alleging
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAR 21 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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various federal claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review
for an abuse of discretion. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 640 (9th Cir.
2002). We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing plaintiffs’ action
without prejudice after Taylor failed to comply with a court order to file an
amended complaint, despite the district court’s warning that noncompliance may
result in dismissal. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) (a district court may dismiss an action
“[i]f the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order”);
Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 640-43 (discussing factors to be considered before
dismissing a case for failure to prosecute or failure to comply with a court order; a
district court’s dismissal should not be disturbed absent “a definite and firm
conviction” of “a clear error of judgment” (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
We do not consider the district court’s interlocutory ruling on the
Washington State defendants’ motion to dismiss. See Ash v. Cvetkov, 739 F.2d
493, 498 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that “interlocutory rulings do not merge into a
judgement of dismissal without prejudice for failure to prosecute whether the
failure to prosecute is purposeful or is a result of negligence or mistake”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment to the Olympia Police
defendants because plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to

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whether these defendants violated any of their rights. See Johns v. County of San
Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 876-77 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining that a non-lawyer may not
bring claims on behalf of others or, without a lawyer, bring suits on behalf of
minors); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that 18
U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 “provide no basis for civil liability”); see also Monell v. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (explaining that official capacity suits
require showing a “policy or custom” violating constitutional rights).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2009).
Plaintiffs’ request to appoint counsel, set forth in the opening brief, is
denied.
AFFIRMED.

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