Mingmei Ding v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MINGMEI DING,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 20-72822
Agency No. A216-269-716
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 14, 2023**
Before: SILVERMAN, SUNG, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.
Mingmei Ding, a native and citizen of China, petitions pro se for review of
the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing her appeal from an
immigration judge’s decision denying her applications for asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAR 17 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the
agency’s factual findings, applying the standards governing adverse credibility
determinations under the REAL ID Act. Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039-
40 (9th Cir. 2010). We deny the petition for review.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination
based on Ding’s omission from her credible fear interview that she lost
consciousness while being interrogated, and inconsistencies between her credible
fear interview and testimony regarding the frequency and duration of the
interrogation and when she began practicing Christianity. See id. at 1048 (adverse
credibility determination reasonable under “the totality of circumstances”); see
also Silva-Pereira v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 1176, 1185 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[A]n adverse
credibility determination may be supported by omissions that are not details, but
new allegations that tell a much different—and more compelling—story of
persecution than [the] initial application[.]” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)); Singh v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1081, 1089-90 (9th Cir. 2005) (indicia of
reliability for asylum officer’s notes). Ding’s explanations do not compel a
contrary conclusion. See Li v. Garland, 13 F.4th 954, 960-61 (9th Cir. 2021)
(agency not compelled to accept explanations for discrepancies). Substantial
evidence also supports the agency’s determination that Ding did not present
corroborative evidence that would otherwise establish her eligibility for relief. See

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Garcia v. Holder, 749 F.3d 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2014) (petitioner’s documentary
evidence was insufficient to independently support claim). Thus, in the absence of
credible testimony, Ding’s asylum and withholding of removal claims fail. See
Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003).
Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of Ding’s CAT claim
because it was based on the same testimony found not credible, and the record does
not otherwise compel the conclusion that it is more likely than not she would be
tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to
China. See id. at 1157.
In light of this disposition, we do not reach Ding’s remaining contentions
regarding her eligibility for relief. See Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 538
(9th Cir. 2004) (courts are not required to decide issues unnecessary to the results
they reach).
We do not consider the materials Ding references in her opening brief that
are not part of the administrative record. See Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 963-64
(9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (court’s review is limited to the administrative record).
The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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