Ranbirbal Singh v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RANBIRBAL SINGH,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 22-286
Agency No. A216-183-915
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 06, 2023**
San Francisco, California
Before: FRIEDLAND and NELSON, Circuit Judges, and CARDONE, ***
District Judge.
Ranbirbal Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of a
decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) upholding the
Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his claim for asylum. We have jurisdiction
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Kathleen Cardone, United States District Judge for
the Western District of Texas, sitting by designation.
FILED
MAR 8 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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We review the agency’s factual findings for substantial evidence. See
Iman v. Barr, 972 F.3d 1058, 1064 (9th Cir. 2020); see also Akosung v. Barr,
970 F.3d 1095, 1102 (9th Cir. 2020) (reviewing the agency’s conclusion about
the safety of relocation for substantial evidence). Under that standard, we defer
to the agency’s findings of fact unless the record compels a contrary conclusion.
Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1692 (2020). When the BIA conducts its
own review rather than simply adopting the IJ’s decision, “our review ‘is
limited to the BIA’s decision, except to the extent the IJ’s opinion is expressly
adopted.’” Hosseini v. Gonzales, 471 F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting
Cordon–Garcia v. INS, 204 F.3d 985, 990 (9th Cir. 2000)).
The BIA assumed without deciding that Singh established past
persecution on account of a protected ground but denied his claim for asylum
because it determined that the government demonstrated that he could safely
and reasonably relocate within India outside of Punjab.1 See Deloso v. Ashcroft,
393 F.3d 858, 863–64 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i), (ii)).
Substantial evidence supports that conclusion.
1 The BIA did not address whether Singh experienced past persecution at
the hands the government or government-sponsored actors, noting that Singh
did not challenge the IJ’s finding that his attackers were neither and that this
issue was therefore waived. Singh makes no substantive argument that the BIA
erred in this waiver determination. Singh has thus forfeited any contention that
he exhausted his administrative remedies on this issue, and we accordingly do
not review his argument that the Congress Party workers who attacked him
were government actors. Cui v. Garland, 13 F.4th 991, 999 n.6 (9th Cir. 2021);
Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 2004).

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In considering whether Singh could safely relocate within India the BIA
agreed with the IJ that Singh’s past attackers were unknown assailants, and that
he was able to stay in India for six weeks after his attack without facing further
harassment from Congress Party members. The agency further found that
although the police with whom Singh spoke did not help him, they did not take
his picture or fingerprint, and Singh indeed testified that he has no reason to
believe the police would seek him out elsewhere in India. The agency
considered whether Singh’s stated intent to continue his political activity would
cause other individuals to harm him outside of Punjab, see Singh v. Whitaker,
914 F.3d 654, 661 (9th Cir. 2019), and concluded that country conditions
evidence indicated that he would not be harmed if he expressed his views
peacefully, and that Singh did not testify that he would engage in violent
activity. The agency also pointed to country conditions evidence indicating that
low-profile Mann Party members who expressed their views peacefully have
been able to relocate successfully within India. The record therefore does not
compel the conclusion that internal relocation would not be safe.
As for whether it would be reasonable to expect Singh to relocate, the
agency considered Singh’s age, education, ability to work, language skills, and
successful move to the United States by himself. It noted that Punjab’s
neighboring state, Haryana, is home to many Sikhs and Punjab speakers, and it
observed that Singh’s family had the resources to assist him in relocating.
Substantial evidence therefore supports the agency’s determination that internal

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relocation would be reasonable. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3) (discussing
factors the agency must consider in its reasonableness analysis); Knezevic v.
Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1206, 1214 (9th Cir. 2004) (same). We therefore deny
Singh’s petition for review of his asylum claim.2
PETITION DENIED.
2 Singh’s opening brief does not argue that the agency erred in denying
his claim for withholding of removal, so that issue has been forfeited. See
Martinez–Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259–60 (9th Cir. 1996).

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