Ruben Antonio Cardona- Guzman v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RUBEN ANTONIO CARDONA-
GUZMAN,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 17-72270
Agency No. A206-460-459
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted November 15, 2022**
Pasadena, California
Before: WARDLAW and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges, and KORMAN,***
District Judge.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Edward R. Korman, United States District Judge for
the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
FILED
JAN 9 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Ruben Antonio Cardona-Guzman (Cardona), a native and citizen of El
Salvador, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA)
decision dismissing his appeal from an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of his
petitions for asylum, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1), withholding of removal, 8 U.S.C. §
1231(b)(3), and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), and we deny the petition.
1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Cardona failed to
establish eligibility for asylum. The BIA found that Cardona “ha[d] not
established a nexus between his past or future harm and an enumerated ground”
because “[t]here is insufficient evidence in the record to demonstrate that gang
members were or would be motivated to harm [Cardona] for any reason other than
to increase their wealth through extortion efforts.”
An applicant “bears the burden of proving eligibility for asylum and must
demonstrate that he has suffered past persecution or has a well-founded fear of
future persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d
1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019).
Cardona was threatened with extortion in person one time by the Mara
Salvatrucha (MS) gang in El Salvador and he received threats via Facebook
messenger while in the United States. This evidence is insufficient to show that

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Cardona was threatened because of his status as a “perceived property owner.”
And Cardona’s testimony that he lived in a nice house in a nice neighborhood is
insufficient to provide a nexus between the extortion attempts and his status as a
“perceived property owner.”
“An [immigrant’s] desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated
by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected
ground.” Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010). The record
simply supports that Cardona was targeted for extortion due to his perceived
wealth in general, not due to his status as a perceived property owner. And we
have held that wealth on its own is not a protected ground. See, e.g., id. at 1015–
16. Therefore, the BIA did not err in finding that there is insufficient evidence to
conclude that Cardona was or would be mistreated on account of a statutorily
protected ground if he returned to El Salvador.
2. The BIA also did not err in finding that Cardona failed to qualify for
withholding of removal, even though withholding of removal has a less demanding
nexus requirement. To be eligible for withholding of removal, an applicant must
show that the evidence in the record demonstrates a “clear probability” of
persecution. Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1059 (9th Cir. 2021). For the same
reasons as stated above, Cardona has failed to establish that his status as a property
owner is even “a reason” that he was extorted, Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d

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351, 359 (9th Cir. 2017), which made him ineligible for withholding of removal.
Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that
Cardona has failed to establish a nexus between any harm or fear of harm and a
protected ground, making him ineligible for asylum or withholding of removal.
3. Nor has Cardona demonstrated that the evidence compels reversal of the
BIA’s decision that Cardona failed to establish eligibility for protection under
CAT. To establish eligibility for CAT protection, an applicant must show “it is
more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed
country of removal.” 8 C.F. R. § 1208.16(c)(2).
Neither Cardona’s testimony nor documentary evidence submitted in
support of his application speak to past torture or a likelihood of future torture, in
which the Salvadoran government acquiesced. While the 2015 U.S. State
Department Country Reports for El Salvador “mention principal human rights
problems,” Cardona’s statement that “the police could have helped him if the MS
[gang] was going to hurt him and if the police knew beforehand” shows that public
officials did not consent or acquiesce to extortion here. Therefore, Cardona cannot
show that torture would be “inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent
or acquiescence of a public official.” B.R. v. Garland, 26 F.4th 827, 844 (9th Cir.
2022) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.18). Accordingly, the BIA’s determination that
Cardona cannot establish eligibility for CAT protection is supported by substantial

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evidence.
PETITION DENIED.

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