Graciela Grajeda-Olvera v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GRACIELA GRAJEDA-OLVERA,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 17-72130
Agency No. A077-208-559
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted December 7, 2022**
San Francisco, California
Before: NGUYEN and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges, and BOUGH,*** District
Judge.
Graciela Grajeda-Olvera (“Grajeda-Olvera”), a native and citizen of Mexico,
petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Stephen R. Bough, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Missouri, sitting by designation.
FILED
DEC 12 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.
We review for substantial evidence the factual findings supporting the BIA’s
decision that an applicant has not established eligibility for asylum, withholding of
removal, or relief under CAT. Madrigal v. Holder, 716 F.3d 499, 503 (9th Cir.
2013). “We review questions of law de novo.” Id.
1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of asylum and
withholding of removal for lack of nexus to a protected ground.1 An asylum
“applicant must establish that race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion was or will be at least one central reason for
persecuting the applicant.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). The standard for
withholding of removal is not as demanding: an applicant must establish only that
the protected ground was “a reason” for the persecution. Barajas-Romero v. Lynch,
846 F.3d 351, 360 (9th Cir. 2017); see also Singh v. Barr, 935 F.3d 822, 827 (9th
Cir. 2019) (per curiam).
Grajeda-Olvera argues that Los Zetas targeted her, at least in part, based on
1 The BIA declined to address the IJ’s adverse credibility finding, instead focusing
on – and affirming – the IJ’s alternate determination that even assuming Grajeda-
Olvera’s testimony was credible, she failed to establish a nexus to a protected
ground.

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her nuclear family membership. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s
determination that “Los Zetas members’ extortion was [not] motivated, even in
part, by any protected ground rather than simply for economic reasons.” Grajeda-
Olvera testified that when she paid money to Los Zetas, she was not harmed. She
also testified that her parents and siblings, who live in Guadalajara and own
businesses, have not had any problems with Los Zetas. We have held that a
petitioner’s “desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or
random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground.” Zetino
v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010). The record does not compel the
conclusion that Grajeda-Olvera’s nuclear family, rather than isolated instances of
crime, motivated these attacks.
2. Substantial evidence also supports the denial of CAT relief. A CAT
applicant must establish she would more likely than not be tortured by or with the
acquiescence of a government official if removed. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.17(a),
208.18(a)(1); Almaghzar v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 915, 922–23 (9th Cir. 2006).
Grajeda-Olvera contends the agency erred by ignoring evidence of
widespread violence and government corruption in Mexico. As an initial matter,
she does not overcome the presumption that the BIA did review the evidence
simply by asserting it did not. See Fernandez v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 592, 603 (9th
Cir. 2006). Furthermore, while the submitted country conditions evidence does

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indicate crime and police corruption in Mexico generally, the record fails to show
that Grajeda-Olvera faces a particularized, ongoing risk of future torture. See
Ramirez-Munoz v. Lynch, 816 F.3d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Where Petitioners
have not shown they are any more likely to be victims of violence and crimes than
the populace as a whole in Mexico, they have failed to carry their burden [under
CAT].”); see also Tzompantzi-Salazar v. Garland, 32 F.4th 696, 706–07 (9th Cir.
2022) (concluding that generalized evidence of violence and crime in Mexico was
not particular to petitioner and therefore was insufficient to establish CAT
eligibility).
PETITION DENIED.

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