United States of America v. Michael Alan Doiel

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL ALAN DOIEL,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 22-10110
D.C. No.
3:12-cr-00009-HDM-VPC-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Howard D. McKibben, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 15, 2022**
Before: CANBY, CALLAHAN, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
Michael Alan Doiel appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying his
second motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, see
United States v. Keller, 2 F.4th 1278, 1281 (9th Cir. 2021), we affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
NOV 22 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 22-10110
Doiel contends that the district court relied on clearly erroneous facts and
abused its discretion by denying compassionate release. We disagree. Contrary to
Doiel’s argument, the court properly treated U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 as informative
rather than binding. See United States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2021).
Further, the court’s factual findings were supported by the record, and it did not
abuse its discretion by concluding that Doiel’s circumstances were not
extraordinary and compelling. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). As the court
explained, Doiel did not establish that he was the only family member able to care
for his ill parents, nor did he show that any current medical issues increase his risk
from COVID-19, or that the Bureau of Prisons is currently failing to protect or
treat him. In addition, even assuming ineffective assistance of trial counsel is a
proper basis for seeking compassionate release, we agree with the district court that
the record belies Doiel’s claim.
In light of the foregoing, we need not reach Doiel’s claims regarding the
district court’s analysis of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. See Keller,
2 F.4th at 1284. However, the record does not support Doiel’s assertion that the
court abused its discretion in weighing those factors. See United States v.
Gutierrez-Sanchez, 587 F.3d 904, 908 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The weight to be given the
various factors in a particular case is for the discretion of the district court.”).
AFFIRMED.

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