Salvador Guevara-Morales v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SALVADOR GUEVARA-MORALES,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 18-72623
Agency No. A201-240-631
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted July 6, 2022**
Seattle, Washington
Before: HAWKINS and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and SEEBORG,*** District
Judge.
Salvador Guevara-Morales petitions for review of the Board of Immigration
Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision dismissing his appeal from an Immigration Judge (“IJ”)
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Richard Seeborg, Chief United States District Judge for
the Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
FILED
JUL 8 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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decision finding him ineligible for cancellation of removal. “We review factual
findings for substantial evidence and legal questions de novo.” Guerra v. Barr, 974
F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2020). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we
deny the petition.
Guevara-Morales argues that the BIA erred in concluding that he was
ineligible for cancelation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C) for having
been convicted of “an offense” under § 1227(a)(2). Specifically, he contends that
his conviction for attempted promotion of prostitution, in violation of sections
161.405(2)(d) and 167.012 of the Oregon Revised Statutes, did not constitute “an
offense” under § 1227(a)(2) because the crime was not committed within five years
after the date of his admission into the country. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)
(defining crimes of moral turpitude).
That argument is foreclosed by binding precedent. This court has upheld the
BIA’s interpretation of § 1229b(b)(1)(C) that “the ‘offense under’ language . . .
incorporates only the offense-specific characteristics of the cross-referenced
sections.” Ortega-Lopez v. Barr, 978 F.3d 680, 691 (9th Cir. 2020) (simplified).
And in regard to § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), “an offense” is established “if the alien has been
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude for which a sentence of one year or
more may be imposed, regardless whether the alien meets the [within-five-years
condition].” Id. at 693. Here then, Guevara-Morales’s argument that the BIA erred

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in concluding he was ineligible for cancellation of removal fails because he does not
challenge the BIA’s conclusion that his conviction for attempted promotion of
prostitution was a crime involving moral turpitude that carried a possible sentence
of at least one year.1
PETITION DENIED.
1 Guevara-Morales’s statement that he “does not concede that his offense was
for a [crime involving moral turpitude] as that issue need not be reached to resolve
this case” is insufficient to preserve any argument relating to that issue. See
Martinez-Serrano v. I.N.S., 94 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Issues raised in a
brief that are not supported by argument are deemed abandoned.”).

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