Maria Concepcion Rivera-Leiva; v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARIA CONCEPCION RIVERA-LEIVA;
et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 19-73077
Agency Nos. A208-784-258
A208-784-259
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted June 15, 2022**
Before: SILVERMAN, WATFORD, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.
Maria Concepcion Rivera-Leiva and her minor daughter, natives and
citizens of El Salvador, petition pro se for review of the Board of Immigration
Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing their appeal from an immigration judge’s
decision denying their application for asylum, and denying Rivera-Leiva’s
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JUN 24 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 19-73077
applications for withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against
Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de
novo the legal question of whether a particular social group is cognizable, except
to the extent that deference is owed to the BIA’s interpretation of the governing
statutes and regulations. Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1241-42 (9th Cir.
2020). We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. Id. at
1241. We deny the petition for review.
The agency did not err in concluding that petitioners did not establish
membership in a cognizable particular social group. See Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d
1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2016) (in order to demonstrate membership in a particular
social group, “[t]he applicant must ‘establish that the group is (1) composed of
members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with
particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question’” (quoting
Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (BIA 2014))); see also Ochoa v.
Gonzales, 406 F.3d 1166, 1170-71 (9th Cir. 2005) (a group of Colombian
“business owners” did not share an “innate characteristic”), abrogated on other
grounds by Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
Thus, petitioners’ asylum claim and Rivera Leiva’s withholding of removal claim
fail.

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In light of this disposition, we do not reach petitioners’ remaining
contentions regarding the timeliness or merits of their asylum and withholding of
removal claims. See Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 2004)
(courts and agencies are not required to decide issues unnecessary to the results
they reach).
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief because
Rivera-Leiva failed to show it is more likely than not she would be tortured by or
with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to El Salvador. See
Aden v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009).
The temporary stay of removal remains in place until issuance of the
mandate.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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