Alejandro Sanchez-Bernal v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ALEJANDRO SANCHEZ-BERNAL,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 20-71898
Agency No. A206-676-891
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted September 14, 2021**
Before: PAEZ, NGUYEN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Alejandro Sanchez-Bernal, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal
from an immigration judge’s decision denying his application for asylum,
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
SEP 20 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence
the agency’s factual findings, including determinations regarding social distinction.
Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2020). We review de
novo the legal question of whether a particular social group is cognizable, except
to the extent that deference is owed to the BIA’s interpretation of the governing
statutes and regulations. Id. We deny the petition for review.
In his opening brief, Sanchez-Bernal does not raise and has therefore waived
any challenge to the agency’s dispositive determinations in denying his application
for asylum and CAT relief. See Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder, 706 F.3d 1072, 1079-80
(9th Cir. 2013) (issues not specifically raised and argued in a party’s opening brief
are waived). Thus, we deny the petition for review as to Sanchez-Bernal’s asylum
and CAT claims.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Sanchez-
Bernal failed to establish his proposed social group is socially distinct. See Conde
Quevedo, 947 F.3d at 1243 (substantial evidence supported the agency’s
determination that petitioner’s proposed social group was not cognizable because
of the absence of society-specific evidence of social distinction). Thus, the BIA
did not err in concluding that Sanchez-Bernal did not establish membership in a
cognizable particular social group. See Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th
Cir. 2016) (in order to demonstrate membership in a particular social group, “[t]he

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applicant must ‘establish that the group is (1) composed of members who share a
common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially
distinct within the society in question’” (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N.
Dec. 227, 237 (BIA 2014))). Thus, Sanchez-Bernal’s withholding of removal
claim fails.
We do not consider the materials Sanchez-Bernal references in his opening
brief that are not part of the administrative record. See Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955,
963 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (court’s review is limited to “the administrative
record upon which the [removal] order is based” (internal quotation and citation
omitted)).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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