United States of America v. PHILLIP DIXON, Jr., AKA Cheddar

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
PHILLIP DIXON, Jr., AKA Cheddar,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 21-30011
D.C. No. 3:13-cr-00042-TMB-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Alaska
Timothy M. Burgess, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 18, 2021**
Before: CANBY, FRIEDLAND, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.
Phillip Dixon, Jr., appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying his
motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for abuse of discretion, see United
States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 797, 799 (9th Cir. 2021), and we affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAY 21 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 21-30011
Dixon argues that the district court erred by determining he did not
demonstrate the necessary “extraordinary and compelling reasons” justifying early
release, and by giving insufficient weight to his rehabilitative efforts while
incarcerated, the portion of his sentence he has already served, and the impact of
COVID-19 on the prison system. The district court considered Dixon’s medical
conditions and rates of COVID-19 infection at the prison, and did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that they did not constitute “extraordinary and compelling
reasons” under § 3582(c)(1)(A). See United States v. Robertson, 895 F.3d 1206,
1213 (9th Cir. 2018) (a district court abuses its discretion only if its decision is
illogical, implausible, or without support in the record).
The district court also considered the fact that Dixon had served
approximately half of his sentence, and concluded that the relevant 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors did not support relief notwithstanding Dixon’s rehabilitative
efforts. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (district court must consider the applicable
§ 3553(a) sentencing factors on a motion for compassionate release). In assessing
those factors, the district court cited the seriousness of the offense, Dixon’s
criminal history, and the need to protect the public. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1),
(a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(C). Because the court’s reasons are supported by the record, it did
not abuse its discretion by denying relief. See Robertson, 895 F.3d at 1213.
AFFIRMED.

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