Charanjit Singh v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHARANJIT SINGH,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 15-71363
Agency No. A078-667-727
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted April 30, 2021**
Before: GRABER, FRIEDLAND, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.
Charanjit Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the
Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an
immigration judge’s decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of
removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAY 5 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial
evidence the agency’s factual findings. Cortez-Pineda v. Holder, 610 F.3d 1118,
1124 (9th Cir. 2010). Because Singh filed his claim for asylum before May 11,
2005, we apply the pre-REAL ID Act standards for adverse credibility findings.
Sinha v. Holder, 564 F.3d 1015, 1021 n.3 (9th Cir. 2009). We deny in part and
dismiss in part the petition for review.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility
determination. First, the record contains inconsistencies regarding the date and
manner of Singh’s entry into the United States. See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d
1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003) (date of entry into the United States can be a key
element of asylum application); Cortez-Pineda, 610 F.3d at 1124 (inconsistency
regarding date of entry into the United States can go to the heart of the claim).
Second, Singh testified inconsistently about the length of his hospitalization after
his second detention and about a crucial date related to his release from police
custody – the date of his father’s funeral. See Chebchoub v. I.N.S., 257 F.3d 1038,
1043 (9th Cir. 2001) (under pre-REAL ID Act standards, an inconsistency that
goes to the heart of the asylum claim is sufficient to support an adverse credibility
finding), superseded by statute as stated in Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034,
1046 (9th Cir. 2010). Finally, Singh provided evasive testimony about errors in his
asylum application. Jibril v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1129, 1137 (9th Cir. 2005)

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(where the record shows the petitioner was evasive or unresponsive, we give
special deference to the IJ’s demeanor finding). In the absence of credible
testimony, Singh’s asylum and withholding of removal claims fail.
Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of Singh’s CAT
claim. The testimony of the expert witness, when considered in light of changed
country conditions and the lack of evidence in the record to indicate that police
would target Singh more than 15 years after the 1992 incident, does not compel the
conclusion that it is more likely than not he would be tortured by or with the
consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to India. See Aden v.
Holder, 589 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating standard).
To the extent Singh asserts the denial of a continuance and ineffective
assistance of his prior counsel violated due process, we lack jurisdiction to
consider these claims because Singh did not raise them before the BIA after his
case was remanded, and these are the type of claimed due process violations that
can be corrected by the BIA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Sola v. Holder, 720 F.3d
1134, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (holding that due process challenges
correctable by the BIA must be exhausted).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

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