Elias Obidi Udechime v. COUNTY OF MARICOPA, Municipal Corporation at County Jail

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ELIAS OBIDI UDECHIME,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
COUNTY OF MARICOPA, Municipal
Corporation at County Jail; PAUL
PENZONE, Sheriff at Maricopa County,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 20-16824
D.C. No. 2:18-cv-03558-SRB-
MHB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Susan R. Bolton, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 20, 2021**
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, TASHIMA and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
Elias Obidi Udechime appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging Fourteenth Amendment
violations arising from his pretrial detention in the Maricopa County Lower
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
APR 29 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Buckeye Jail. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo
the district court’s decision on cross-motions for summary judgment. Guatay
Christian Fellowship v. County of San Diego, 670 F.3d 957, 970 (9th Cir. 2011).
We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Enlow v. Salem-Keizer
Yellow Cab Co., Inc., 389 F.3d 802, 811 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants on
Udechime’s claims based on the conditions of his confinement in Administrative
Restrictive Housing (“ARH”) because Udechime failed to raise a genuine dispute
of material fact as to whether confinement in his cell for approximately 23 hours
per day, with one hour per day of dayroom access and four additional hours per
week of recreation time, was for the purpose of punishment. See Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 540 (1979) (“Restraints that are reasonably related to the
institution’s interest in maintaining jail security do not, without more, constitute
unconstitutional punishment, even if they are discomforting . . . .”); see also Pierce
v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1208 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming district court
order requiring two hours exercise per week).
Summary judgment for defendants on Udechime’s claims based on his
placement in ARH was proper because Udechime failed to raise a genuine dispute
of material fact as to whether his placement in ARH, even if he did not consent to
it, resulted from a governmental policy or practice, or that he was denied

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procedural due process as a result of a governmental policy or practice. See
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (a suit against a government
employee in his official capacity is a suit against the government entity the
individual represents); Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1073-76
(9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (discussing requirements to establish liability under
Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).
Because we affirm the grant of summary judgment, it is not necessary to
consider the denial of injunctive relief. See HWE, Inc. v. JB Research, Inc., 993
F.2d 694, 696 (9th Cir. 1993) (denial of preliminary injunction is rendered moot by
affirming grant of summary judgment).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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