Cindy M. Estrada v. ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CINDY M. ESTRADA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 19-35734
D.C. No. 3:18-cv-05362-RSM
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Ricardo S. Martinez, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 2, 2021**
Seattle, Washington
Before: GRABER, McKEOWN, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
Cindy Estrada appeals the district court’s affirmance of the Social Security
Commissioner’s denial of her application for disability insurance benefits and
supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAR 31 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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The parties are familiar with the facts, so we do not repeat them here. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we vacate the denial of benefits and
remand for reconsideration in light of Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648 (9th Cir.
2017).
The ALJ concluded that Estrada’s “statements concerning the intensity,
persistence and limiting effects of [her] symptoms are not entirely consistent with
the medical evidence and other evidence in the record . . . .” The ALJ noted that
the record “lacks significant findings to support [Estrada’s] extreme allegations,”
“support for her neck and hand complaints is elusive,” examinations are within
“normal limits,” neck pain patterns do not correlate with MRI findings, and
“diagnostic imaging of the hips and hands were repeatedly negative,” among other
statements. Estrada argues that the ALJ improperly discounted her testimony
because the lack of objective findings is consistent with her fibromyalgia—a
diagnosis that the ALJ recognized as a severe impairment adequately supported by
medical evidence at step two.
The ALJ did not have the benefit of our decision in Revels, which was issued
two months after the ALJ’s decision. In Revels, we concluded that the ALJ erred
in rejecting a claimant’s testimony where the ALJ stated that the testimony was
“undercut by the lack of ‘objective findings’ supporting her claims of severe pain”
because examinations showing mostly normal results “are perfectly consistent with

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debilitating fibromyalgia.” 874 F.3d at 666. We noted that the ALJ’s error “arose
from an apparent fundamental misunderstanding of fibromyalgia,” id. at 662, and
emphasized that fibromyalgia “is diagnosed entirely on the basis of patients’
reports of pain and other symptoms, and there are no laboratory tests to confirm the
diagnosis,” id. at 666 (quotations omitted). Here, in assessing the credibility of
Estrada’s symptoms testimony, the ALJ appears to have similarly failed to
construe the medical evidence “in light of fibromyalgia’s unique symptoms and
diagnostic methods.” Id. at 662. For this reason, we remand.
On remand, the ALJ should address how the fibromyalgia diagnosis weighs
on his evaluation of the medical evidence for purposes of assessing the credibility
of Estrada’s symptoms testimony, id. at 666, explain why he deemed Estrada’s
treatment “conservative” for fibromyalgia, id. at 667, and address how evidence
that Estrada at times denied pain comports with the recognition that “the symptoms
of [fibromyalgia] can wax and wane so that a person may have ‘bad days and good
days.’” Social Security Ruling, SSR 12-2p (Jul. 25, 2012); see also Revels, 874
F.3d at 663. Because we remand for consideration of Revels, we do not reach
Estrada’s other challenges to the ALJ’s decision.
VACATED and REMANDED.
Each party shall pay its own costs on appeal.

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