Linda Lynaugh v. Michael Vincent; Stinson Leonard Street Llp

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LINDA LYNAUGH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL VINCENT; STINSON
LEONARD STREET LLP,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 20-15363
D.C. No. 2:19-cv-04643-DJH
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Diane J. Humetewa, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 16, 2021**
Before: GRABER, R. NELSON, and HUNSAKER, Circuit Judges.
Linda Lynaugh appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
her action alleging Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) claims. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Kwan v.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAR 19 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 20-15363
SanMedica Int’l, 854 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2017). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Lynaugh’s action because Lynaugh
failed to allege facts sufficient to show a qualifying debt under the FDCPA. See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Turner v.
Cook, 362 F.3d 1219, 1226-27 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that court judgments are
not transactions under the FDCPA; a transaction under the FDCPA must involve
some kind of business dealing or consensual obligation).
We reject as unsupported by the record Lynaugh’s contentions that
defendants made fraudulent misrepresentations in the district court.
AFFIRMED.

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