Albert M. Young v. ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ALBERT M. YOUNG,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 19-15790
D.C. No. 1:18-cv-00195-DKW-RLP
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii
Derrick Kahala Watson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 1, 2021**
Honolulu, Hawaii
Before: CLIFTON, R. NELSON, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges.
Albert Young appeals from the district court’s order affirming the decision
of the Commissioner of Social Security denying his claim for disability insurance
benefits. We affirm.
1. We reject Young’s argument that the ALJ failed to include all of Young’s
limitations in the hypotheticals the ALJ posed to the vocational expert. Young’s
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as
provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision without
oral argument. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
FILED
FEB 11 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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argument relies on the erroneous premise that the ALJ found that Young “could lift
no weight on a frequent basis.” The ALJ made no such finding. On the contrary,
the ALJ expressly determined that “the claimant can lift and/or carry at the light
level of exertion (i.e., 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently . . .).” The
fact that the ALJ omitted to mention that Young could lift 10 pounds frequently in
his earlier summary of Young’s residual functional capacity does not negate or
vitiate the ALJ’s specific finding on this score. The ALJ therefore properly
included this limitation in the questions posed to the vocational expert. Given that
the “hypothetical that the ALJ posed to the [vocational expert] contained all of the
limitations that the ALJ found credible and supported by substantial evidence in
the record,” the “ALJ’s reliance on testimony the [vocational expert] gave in
response to the hypothetical therefore was proper.” Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d
1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005).
2. The ALJ properly declined to credit Young’s contentions concerning the
extent of his back pain and related symptoms, as set forth by Young in his written
statements for the record and his oral testimony at both hearings.
a. As an initial matter, we reject Young’s argument that, by failing
expressly to mention Young’s assertion that his back pain created a need for him to
take weeks off from work at a time, the ALJ thereby overlooked that testimony and
failed to give reasons to discount it. The ALJ specifically cited Young’s written

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statements and testimony as among the items he had “carefully consider[ed],” and
he gave specific reasons why he did not credit Young’s claims concerning the
“limiting effects” of Young’s symptoms, including his “back and knee pain.” The
ALJ was not required to mention explicitly, in his ruling, each detail of Young’s
testimony, such as the need to take off weeks at a time from work. See Lambert v.
Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 1277 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Our cases do not require ALJs to
perform a line-by-line exegesis of the claimant’s testimony . . . .”).
b. We conclude that, in making his adverse credibility finding, the ALJ
articulated “‘clear and convincing reasons,’” Carmickle v. Commissioner, Soc. Sec.
Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504
F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007)), which are supported by substantial evidence in
the record, Marsh v. Colvin, 792 F.3d 1170, 1173 n.2 (9th Cir. 2015).
An ALJ may consider inconsistency between a claimant’s symptom
testimony and the objective medical evidence in the record in determining whether
to discount the claimant’s symptom testimony. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(1)–
(2); Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012). Substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s conclusion that this ground was applicable here. The relevant
period of time at issue is January 1, 1996 (the date of alleged disability) through
June 30, 1999 (Young’s date last insured). The ALJ noted that medical records
from that time period indicate that Young had a variety of ailments, such as an

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accidental injury to his hand and a bout of dengue fever, but that these records also
included a physical examination that described his condition as “generally
unremarkable.” Moreover, the ALJ noted that there were “no x-rays, CT scans,
magnetic resonance images, electrodiagnostic studies” or other comparable
“objective medical evidence” to support Young’s claims. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1529(c)(2) (“Objective medical evidence of this type is a useful indicator . . .
[of] the intensity and persistence of your symptoms . . . .”). Although some of the
records from that time period, as well as from the immediately ensuing years,
occasionally mentioned back pain, the ALJ permissibly found that the objective
medical evidence in the record did not support Young’s symptom testimony and
weighed in favor of discounting this testimony. See Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d
853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (“While subjective pain testimony cannot be rejected on
the sole ground that it is not fully corroborated by objective medical evidence, the
medical evidence is still a relevant factor in determining the severity of the
claimant’s pain and its disabling effects.”).
The ALJ also properly concluded that the “minimal treatment record prior to
June 30, 1999” did not support Young’s “subjective complaints.” As we have
explained, “‘evidence of conservative treatment is sufficient to discount a
claimant’s testimony regarding severity of an impairment.’” See Tommasetti v.
Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d

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742, 751 (9th Cir. 2007)) (further quotation marks omitted). Substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s conclusion on this score, because the record evidence from the
relevant time frame is devoid of any significant treatment directed towards
Young’s occasional contemporaneous complaints of back pain.
Finally, the ALJ also noted that his evaluation of Young’s claimed
limitations was consistent with the opinion testimony offered by a non-examining
physician who had reviewed the entire record. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(1),
(4); Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2008). The ALJ
properly concluded that, although this opinion was provided 17 years after the last
insured date, it represented, in light of the record as a whole, the “best
approximation” of Young’s limitations with respect to the relevant time period.
AFFIRMED.

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