Michelle S. Blackwell v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., on behalf of Morgan Stanley abs Capital 1, Inc. Trust…

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MICHELLE S. BLACKWELL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., on behalf of
Morgan Stanley abs Capital 1, Inc. Trust
2005-WMC6, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-WMC6; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 19-55994
D.C. No. 2:19-cv-02307-R-PLA
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 20, 2021**
Before: McKEOWN, CALLAHAN, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.
Michelle S. Blackwell appeals pro se from the district court’s orders
dismissing Blackwell’s action alleging federal and state law claims arising out of
foreclosure proceedings and declaring Blackwell a vexatious litigant. We have
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JAN 28 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the existence of subject
matter jurisdiction. Naffe v. Frey, 789 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2015). We
review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s dismissal of the action for
failure to comply with local rules. Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423
(9th Cir. 1986). We affirm.
The district court properly assumed subject matter jurisdiction over
Blackwell’s action because Blackwell alleged a claim under the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act and therefore the district court had federal question
jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331; Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470,
475 (1998) (to establish jurisdiction under § 1331, a federal question must be
“presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Blackwell’s
action after Blackwell failed to file an opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss.
See C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-12 (providing that “failure to file any required document…”
may be deemed consent to the granting or denial of the motion); Henderson, 779
F.2d at 1423.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by striking Blackwell’s first
amended complaint because Blackwell did not file it within 21 days of defendants’
filing a responsive pleading. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B); Preminger v. Peake,

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552 F.3d 757, 769 n.11 (9th Cir. 2008) (setting forth the standard of review for a
district court’s decision concerning its management of litigation). The district
court did not abuse its discretion by denying Blackwell’s subsequent motion for
leave to file the amended complaint because any amendment would have been
futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th
Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and stating that leave to amend may be
denied where amendment would be futile).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Blackwell’s motion
to reconsider the district court’s orders granting defendants’ motion to dismiss,
declaring Blackwell a vexatious litigant, and denying leave to amend because
Blackwell failed to demonstrate that she was entitled to relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b); Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255,
1263 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth elements for reconsideration under Rule 60(b)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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