Tyler G. Miller v. State of Washington

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TYLER G. MILLER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 19-35542

D.C. No. 3:19-cv-05308-RJB

MEMORANDUM
*

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Robert J. Bryan, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 8, 2020
**

Before: TASHIMA, SILVERMAN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

Tyler G. Miller appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.56.300 et seq.,
which provides an alternative process for allocating Washington’s electoral votes
for president and vice-president, is unconstitutional. We have jurisdiction under 28

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED

SEP 17 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

2 19-35542
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal on the bases of standing and
ripeness. Desert Water Agency v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 849 F.3d 1250, 1253
(9th Cir. 2017). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Miller’s action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction because Miller failed to establish that he suffered an injury in
fact as required for Article III standing, and his claims are not yet ripe. See Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (elements of Article III
standing); Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (“[W]e have
repeatedly reiterated that threatened injury must be certainly impending to
constitute injury in fact, and that [a]llegations of possible future injury are not
sufficient.” (citation omitted)); see also Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296
(1998) (“A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future
events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Miller leave to
amend his complaint because any amendment would have been futile. See
Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011)
(setting forth standard of review and stating that leave to amend may be denied
where amendment would be futile).
AFFIRMED.