United States v. 2020-08-10 | 14-73438 | HYEJEONG CHA V. WILLIAM BARR | nonprecedential | memorandum disposition |

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HYEJEONG CHA,
Petitioner,
v.
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 14-73438
Agency No. A087-885-444
MEMORANDUM
*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted August 6, 2020
**
San Francisco, California
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and HAWKINS and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
Hyejeong Cha, a citizen of South Korea, petitions for review of the Board of
Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”)
denial of her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under
FILED
AUG 10 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
* *
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1252, and we deny the petition for review.
Because the parties are familiar with the facts of this case, we need not
recount them here. When the BIA essentially adopts the IJ’s decision while adding
its own reasoning, we review both decisions. See Lopez-Cardona v. Holder, 662
F.3d 1110, 1111 (9th Cir. 2011). We review adverse credibility determinations for
substantial evidence. See Bassene v. Holder, 737 F.3d 530, 536 (9th Cir. 2013).
Under the REAL ID Act, any inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood is relevant to
the credibility determination. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).
The agency’s adverse credibility determinations were supported by
substantial evidence. Cha omitted facts from her application and declaration to
which she later testified. For example, she testified that she received numerous
phone call threats during her time in South Korea, and she testified that she did not
want to return to South Korea because she feared her ex-boyfriend who had also
threatened her. However, her application and declaration did not include this
information. When confronted with the omission regarding the threats made by
her ex-boyfriend at her hearing before the IJ, she was unresponsive. These events
were more than mere details; they went to the very core of Cha’s claim and, as the
BIA held, “materially altered [her] entire story in a way that cast doubt on [her]
2

credibility.” Zamanov v. Holder, 649 F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 2011). In short, the
agency’s adverse credibility determinations were “[s]upported by reasonable,
substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” INS v.
Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992).
Thus, we deny the petition for review of her claims for asylum and
withholding of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2); see also Farah v. Ashcroft,
348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003) (reasoning a failure to satisfy the lower
standard of proof required to establish eligibility for asylum necessarily results in a
failure to demonstrate eligibility for withholding of removal).
Likewise, Cha has not presented sufficient evidence demonstrating that “it is
more likely than not that . . . she would be tortured if removed” to South Korea. 8
C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2). Cha has alleged only that she will be tortured if she is
captured and returned to North Korea; she has not shown that this scenario is more
likely to occur than not if she is removed to South Korea. Thus, her claim is too
speculative to support CAT protection. See Zheng v. Holder, 644 F.3d 829,
835–36 (9th Cir. 2011) (denying CAT protection where likelihood of torture
remained speculative).
PETITION DENIED.
3