United States v. 2020-07-23 | 19-17116 | PETER HARRELL V. CLINT DINGMAN | nonprecedential | memorandum disposition |

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PETER T. HARRELL,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CLINT DINGMAN; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 19-17116

D.C. No. 2:19-cv-00031-KJM-AC

MEMORANDUM
*

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Kimberly J. Mueller, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 14, 2020
**

Before: CANBY, FRIEDLAND, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.

Peter T. Harrell appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion a
dismissal for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. McHenry

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED

JUL 23 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

2 19-17116
v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996). We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Harrell’s action
with prejudice because Harrell failed to comply with Rule 8’s requirement of a
short and plain statement of the claims, despite multiple warnings and
opportunities to do so. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d at
1177 (district court did not abuse discretion in dismissing with prejudice on the
basis of Rule 8, where the complaint was “argumentative, prolix, replete with
redundancy, and largely irrelevant”); Nevijel v. N. Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d
671, 674 (9th Cir. 1981) (dismissal under Rule 8 was proper where the complaint
was “verbose, confusing and conclusory”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Harrell leave to
amend a third time because he failed to comply with the district court’s previous
orders. See Gordon v. City of Oakland, 627 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010)
(setting forth standard of review and explaining that leave to amend may be denied
if amendment would be futile); Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 90
F.3d 351, 355 (9th Cir. 1996) (“The district court’s discretion to deny leave to
amend is particularly broad where plaintiff has previously amended the
complaint.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

3 19-17116
We reject as without merit Harrell’s contention that his due process rights
were violated by the magistrate judge’s decision to vacate a portion of a previous
order without prior notice or that the district court erred by failing to rule on his
request for an intra-district transfer.
AFFIRMED.