Syed Nazim Ali v. Apple, Inc.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SYED NAZIM ALI,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

APPLE, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 18-17264

D.C. No. 3:18-cv-03945-RS

MEMORANDUM
*

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Richard Seeborg, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 3, 2020
**

Before: MURGUIA, CHRISTEN, and BADE, Circuit Judges.

Syed Nazim Ali appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
his employment action alleging federal and state law claims. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010). We

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED

MAR 9 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

2 18-17264
affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Ali’s discrimination and retaliation
claims under Title VII and the California Fair Employment Housing Act (“FEHA”)
because Ali failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (a plaintiff fails to show he is entitled to relief if
the complaint’s factual allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of [the alleged] misconduct”); Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 541
(9th Cir. 2006) (elements of a Title VII retaliation claim); Costa v. Desert Palace,
Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 847-48 (9th Cir. 2002) (the protected characteristic must be a
motivating factor for the employment decision for a Title VII discrimination
claim); Harris v. City of Santa Monica, 294 P.3d 49, 66 (Cal. 2013) (the protected
characteristic must be a substantial motivating factor for the employment decision
for a FEHA discrimination claim); Mamou v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc., 81 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 406, 428 (Ct. App. 2008) (elements of a FEHA retaliation claim).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Ali leave to file a
second amended complaint because leave to amend would have been futile. See
Serra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard of
review and factors for determining whether to grant leave to amend); Metzler Inv.
GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1072 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he
district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where

3 18-17264
plaintiff has previously amended the complaint.” (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Ali’s state law
claims rather than remanding his state law claims to state court. See Satey v.
JPMorgan Chase & Co., 521 F.3d 1087, 1090-91 (9th Cir. 2008) (setting forth
standard of review and explaining that the district court has discretion to retain
supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims even if the federal law claims are
dismissed).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.