United States v. 2020-02-06 | 18-72984 | KARALAINI SEWALE V. WILLIAM BARR | nonprecedential | memorandum disposition |

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KARALAINI LIKUDILA SEWALE,

Petitioner,

v.

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,

Respondent.

No. 18-72984

Agency No. A200-545-226

MEMORANDUM
*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 4, 2020
**

Before: FERNANDEZ, SILVERMAN, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.

Karalaini Likudila Sewale, a native and citizen of Fiji, petitions for review
of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing her appeal from an
immigration judge’s decision denying her application for cancellation of removal.
Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo questions of
law, including claims of due process violations. Padilla-Martinez v. Holder, 770

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED

FEB 6 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

2 18-72984
F.3d 825, 830 (9th Cir. 2014). We dismiss in part and deny in part the petition for
review.
We lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s discretionary determination that
Sewale did not show exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to her lawful
permanent resident husband. See Vilchiz-Soto v. Holder, 688 F.3d 642, 644 (9th
Cir. 2012) (absent a colorable legal or constitutional claim, the court lacks
jurisdiction to review the agency’s hardship determination). Sewale’s contentions
that the agency did not properly consider or weigh the evidence of hardship are not
colorable constitutional claims. See Martinez-Rosas v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 926,
930 (9th Cir. 2005). Further, there is no support in the record for Sewale’s
contentions that the agency denied cancellation of removal as punishment for her
husband’s history of alcoholism or prevented her from receiving a full and fair
hearing. See id. (“To be colorable in this context, . . . the claim must have some
possible validity.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Sewale has not established any error in the BIA’s conclusion that the
regulations governing voluntary departure do not provide for enlargement of the
five-day bond period. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(c)(3). Nor do the regulations allow
the BIA to reinstate voluntary departure in the absence of proof that the bond has
been posted. See id.; cf. Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder, 702 F.3d 504, 526-27 (9th
Cir. 2012) (en banc) (“Congress has unambiguously granted the Attorney General

3 18-72984
authority to control the scope of voluntary departure grants in [8 U.S.C.] § 1229c
and [] he has reasonably exercised his authority in promulgating the regulation” at
8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(i)).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED in part; DENIED in part.