Sarah Isbell v. Oklahoma Department of Human Services;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SARAH ISBELL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 18-16629
D.C. No. 3:18-cv-00269-WHA
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
William Alsup, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 11, 2019**
Before: WALLACE, CANBY, and TASHIMA, Circuit Judges.
Sarah Isbell appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing her
42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims relating to Oklahoma
state court child support orders. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review de novo. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003) (jurisdictional
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
DEC 13 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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dismissal under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine); Shanks v. Dressel, 540 F.3d 1082,
1086 (9th Cir. 2008) (dismissal for failure to state a claim). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Isbell’s § 1983 claims challenging the
Oklahoma state court’s child support proceedings for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because they are a “de facto
appeal” of decisions of the Oklahoma state court and are “inextricably intertwined”
with those state court decisions. See Noel, 341 F.3d at 1163-65; see also Cooper v.
Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 782 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that Rooker–Feldman
doctrine bars “inextricably intertwined” claim where federal adjudication “would
impermissibly undercut the state ruling on the same issues” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
The district court properly dismissed Isbell’s remaining § 1983 claims
challenging defendants’ enforcement of the Oklahoma state court child support
orders, and her disability discrimination claims under Title II of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, because Isbell
failed to allege sufficient facts to state a plausible claim. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627
F.3d 338, 340-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be liberally
construed, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible
claim for relief); Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1135 (9th Cir. 2001)
(setting forth elements of a prima facie case under the ADA and Rehabilitation

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Act); see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (setting forth elements of a
§ 1983 claim).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Isbell’s motions for
appointment of counsel because Isbell failed to demonstrate exceptional
circumstances. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting
forth standard of review and requirement of “exceptional circumstances” for
appointment of counsel).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Isbell’s motion
relating to attorney’s fees because Isbell was not the prevailing party in this action
as judgment was entered against her on all of her claims. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(allowing reasonable attorney’s fee award to prevailing party in civil rights action).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Isbell further leave
to amend because amendment would have been futile. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp.
of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 725-26 (9th Cir. 2000) (setting forth standard of review and
explaining that “[a] district court acts within its discretion to deny leave to amend
when amendment would be futile”).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

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All pending motions are denied.
AFFIRMED.

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