Ryan Drexler v. Bradford Billet

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RYAN DREXLER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BRADFORD BILLET,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 18-55947
D.C. No.
2:17-cv-08552-DMG-JC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Dolly M. Gee, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 8, 2019**
Pasadena, California
Before: FARRIS and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges, and KENDALL,*** District
Judge.
Ryan Drexler appeals the district court’s dismissal, pursuant to California’s
anti-SLAPP statute, of his breach of contract and fraudulent inducement action.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Virginia M. Kendall, United States District Judge for
the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
FILED
NOV 13 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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He argues the district court failed to apply Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) when
evaluating his complaint, instead mistakenly applying Rule 56 by considering
extrinsic evidence. Drexler also contends the district court erred in finding he was
not an intended beneficiary of a contract—the breach of which led in part to this
suit—and by determining that Bradford Billet did not contract away his right to
anti-SLAPP protections. The parties are familiar with the facts, so we do not
repeat them here. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm the
district court.
We review de novo a district court's ruling on a motion to strike under
California's anti-SLAPP statute. Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254, 261
(9th Cir. 2013).
Drexler relies on our recent holding that a court evaluating a California anti-
SLAPP motion challenging the legal sufficiency of a claim should apply the Rule
12(b)(6) standard, whereas a motion to strike challenging the factual sufficiency of
a claim is subject to the Rule 56 standard with accompanying discovery. Planned
Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Ctr. for Med. Progress, 890 F.3d 828, 834 (9th
Cir. 2018). This reliance is misplaced, as the district court based its ruling on the
general nature of Drexler’s allegations, only glancingly referenced Billet’s
declaration, and therefore “correctly applied a Rule 12(b)(6) standard to

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Defendant[’s] Motion to Strike challenging the legal sufficiency of Plaintiff[’s]
complaint.” Planned Parenthood, 890 F.3d at 835.
Drexler’s arguments that the district court mistakenly concluded he was not
an intended beneficiary to the 2014 confidentiality agreement and that Billet
waived anti-SLAPP protection are similarly unavailing. The district court
correctly applied New York law requiring that contracting parties’ intention to
benefit a third party be plain “on the face of the contract.” Synovus Bank of Tampa
Bay v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 487 F. Supp. 2d 360, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). The
confidentiality agreement’s reference to “certain information and documents
concerning [Drexler-Billet’s] former business and personal interests” is insufficient
to conclude that Drexler was an intended beneficiary of the 2014 agreement.
Drexler’s waiver argument is derivative of the beneficiary claim, and therefore also
fails.
AFFIRMED.

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