Jose Luis Pena v. WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOSE LUIS PENA,
Petitioner,
v.
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 16-73386
Agency No. A029-136-829
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted October 15, 2019**
Before: FARRIS, LEAVY, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
Jose Luis Pena, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review of
the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an
immigration judge’s decision denying relief under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and
Central American Relief Act (“NACARA”) and asylum and related relief. We
have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo questions of law.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
OCT 18 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Bonilla v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 575, 581 (9th Cir. 2016). We review for substantial
evidence the agency’s denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under
the Convention Against Torture. (“CAT”). Silva-Pereira v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 1176,
1184 (9th Cir. 2016). We deny the petition for review.
The agency did not err in determining Pena is ineligible for NACARA relief,
where it properly determined that the time period for establishing good moral
character began with Pena’s 2008 conviction. See Campos-Hernandez v. Sessions,
889 F.3d 564, 571 (9th Cir. 2018) (deferring to Matter of Castro-Lopez, 26 I. & N.
Dec. 693 (BIA 2015) to determine the ten-year continuous physical presence
period runs from the most recent commission of an act constituting a ground for
removal); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.66(c)(3) (good moral character is required during the
period of continuous physical presence).
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that Pena did not
establish past persecution, where the threats he received from guerillas were never
realized and stopped soon after he relocated. See Nahrvani v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d
1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005) (most threats do not rise to the level of persecution).
Accordingly, he was not entitled to a presumption that he had a well-founded fear
of future persecution. See id. at 1154 n.4. Substantial evidence also supports the
agency’s finding that Pena could not establish an objectively reasonable fear of
future persecution, where his fear of any former or current guerilla causing him

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harm was speculative. See id. at 1154 (fear of future persecution was too
speculative to support an asylum claim).
Substantial evidence supports the denial of relief under the CAT, where
Pena has not shown it is more likely than not he will be subjected to torture in El
Salvador by or with the acquiescence of a public official. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.18(a)(1).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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