United States of America v. Eric Anthony Huerta

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ERIC ANTHONY HUERTA,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 19-30069
D.C. No. 2:11-cr-00014-DWM-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Donald W. Molloy, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 18, 2019**
Before: FARRIS, TASHIMA, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Eric Anthony Huerta appeals from the district court’s judgment and
challenges the 15-year term of supervised release imposed upon his second
revocation of supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
and we affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
SEP 25 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 19-30069
Huerta argues that the 15-year term of supervised release exceeds the
statutory maximum. This argument lacks merit. The term of supervised release
authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in Huertas’s original term of
supervised release was life. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k). Thus, upon revocation, the
district court could have imposed a new term of supervised release as long as life,
notwithstanding the seven months of imprisonment imposed upon Huerta’s two
revocations. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h); United States v. Crowder, 738 F.3d 1103,
1104-05 (9th Cir. 2013) (district court did not err in imposing another lifetime term
of supervision upon revocation, even though it also sentenced defendant to 14
months’ imprisonment, because requirement that terms of imprisonment be
subtracted from maximum authorized supervised release term has no practical
effect when maximum supervised release term is life). Huerta attempts to
distinguish Crowder on the ground that the district court here imposed a supervised
release term of 15 years at both the original sentencing and upon the first
revocation, rather than a term of life as was ordered in Crowder. However, he
cites no authority to support this distinction, and neither Crowder nor the
applicable statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h), supports it.
AFFIRMED.

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