Irma J. Grant v. Seterus, Inc.;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
IRMA J. GRANT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SETERUS, INC.; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 17-56907
D.C. No. 2:16-cv-06692-SJO-AJW
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
S. James Otero, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 21, 2019**
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, LEAVY and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Irma J. Grant appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in her action
alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and state
law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a
dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Kwan v. SanMedica
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAY 29 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Int’l, 854 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2017). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Grant’s FDCPA claim against
defendant Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) because Grant
failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Fannie Mae was a debt collector under
the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(ii) (excluding from the definition of
debt collector a creditor collecting debts on its behalf); Afewerki v. Anaya Law
Grp., 868 F.3d 771, 779, n.1 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Under the FDCPA, a creditor
collecting debts on its own behalf is not a ‘debt collector.’” (citation omitted));
Schlegel v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 720 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2013) (plaintiff
“must plead factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that [the defendant] is a debt collector” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
The district court properly dismissed Grant’s FDCPA claim brought under
15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6) against defendant Seterus, Inc. because Grant failed to allege
facts sufficient to show that Seterus’s conduct was unfair or unconscionable. See
15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6) (prohibiting unfair or unconscionable conduct in enforcing a
security interest); Dowers v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 852 F.3d 964, 971 (9th Cir.
2017) (discussing protections for borrowers set forth in § 1692f(6)); see also

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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court properly dismissed Grant’s cancellation of instrument
claim because Grant failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Cal. Civ. Code § 3412 (grounds for cancellation of
a written instrument).
The district court properly dismissed Grant’s claim against Seterus under
California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) because it was derivative of her
§ 1692f(6) claim. See Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 832, 856 (Ct. App. 2014) (“To state a cause of action based on an
unlawful business act or practice under the UCL, a plaintiff must allege facts
sufficient to show a violation of some underlying law.”).
We do not consider Grant’s claim under California’s Homeowner’s Bill of
Rights because Grant failed to replead it in her operative complaint. See Lacey v.
Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 925 (9th Cir. 2012) (claims dismissed with leave
to amend are waived if not repled).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

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in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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