ICT LAW AND TECHNOLOGY GROUP PLLC, FKA John Doe v. Seatree Pllc, is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Washington,…

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ICT LAW AND TECHNOLOGY GROUP
PLLC, FKA John Doe,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SEATREE PLLC, is a corporation organized
under the laws of the State of Washington,
said corporation further registered as a
Professional Limited Liability Company
(Pllc) with the Washington Secretary of
State; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 18-35823
D.C. No. 2:17-cv-01572-TSZ
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Thomas S. Zilly, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 21, 2019**
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, FRIEDLAND and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.
ICT Law & Technology Group PLLC, FKA John Doe (“ICT”) appeals from
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAY 28 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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the district court’s judgment dismissing its 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal
claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a
dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). Lyon v. Chase Bank USA,
N.A., 656 F.3d 877, 883 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed ICT’s procedural due process claim
(Count I) because ICT had an adequate state remedy. See Brogan v. San Mateo
County, 901 F.2d 762, 764 (9th Cir. 1990) (“When state remedies are adequate to
protect an individual’s procedural due process rights, a section 1983 action
alleging a violation of those rights will not stand.”); see also Wash. R. App. P. 17.7
(setting forth procedures for an objection to a commissioner’s ruling).
The district court properly dismissed ICT’s claims regarding garnishment
(Counts II and III) because ICT failed to allege facts sufficient to show that
defendant King County failed to follow statutory procedures governing
garnishment. See Wash. Rev. Code § 6.27.060, 6.27.070 (procedures for writ
application and issuance of writ); Watkins v. Peterson Enters., Inc., 973 P.2d 1037,
1043-46 (Wash. 1999) (en banc) (explaining that statutory procedures governing
the garnishment process require strict adherence); see also Castro v. County of Los
Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1073-76 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (discussing
requirements to establish municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).

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The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying ICT’s motions for
reconsideration because ICT failed to set forth any basis for relief from the
judgment. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d
1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for
relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) or 60(b)).
We reject as without merit ICT’s contention regarding denial of its motion
for declaratory judgment.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or documents and facts not presented to the district court. See
Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Elias,
921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990).
Appellant’s notices of intent to unseal (Docket Entry Nos. 29 and 49) will be
resolved in a separate order. All other pending motions and requests, including
ICT’s request set forth in Docket Entry No. 32 for a telephonic hearing, are denied.
AFFIRMED.

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