Jiselle A. Waterhouse v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JISELLE A. WATERHOUSE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 17-35804
D.C. No. 3:16-cv-05968-MAT
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Mary Alice Theiler, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 12, 2018
Seattle, Washington
Before: N.R. SMITH and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges, and PAYNE,** District
Judge.
Jiselle A. Waterhouse (“Waterhouse”) appeals the District Court’s order
affirming the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) partial denial of her Social
Security benefits claim. Waterhouse initially claimed a disability onset date of July
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The Honorable Robert E. Payne, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.
FILED
JAN 11 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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31, 2009. The ALJ determined Waterhouse to be disabled as of March 12, 2014, but
not before. The issue on appeal—as acknowledged by Waterhouse’s counsel at oral
argument—is whether the ALJ erred in determining that March 12, 2014 was the
proper date. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. §
405(g), and we affirm.
1. We review the District Court’s order affirming an ALJ’s denial of
Social Security disability benefits de novo. See Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664,
674 (9th Cir. 2017). We may set aside an ALJ’s disability determination “only when
the ALJ’s decision is ‘based on legal error or not supported by substantial evidence
in the record.’” Id. (quoting Benton ex rel. Benton v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1035
(9th Cir. 2003)). Where the evidence in the record is amenable to different rational
interpretations, we must uphold the ALJ’s determination if the ALJ relied on one of
those rational interpretations. Id. at 674-75.
2. Waterhouse has the burden to establish that the record requires a finding
of an earlier disability onset date. She has failed to meet that burden. In her briefs,
Waterhouse urges that the onset date should be July 31, 2009. However, at oral
argument, Waterhouse’s counsel conceded that evidence in the record did not
support a finding that Waterhouse was disabled during 2009 and 2010. At oral
argument, Waterhouse’s counsel proposed several additional dates in 2011 that
could be considered the disability onset date. Waterhouse did not meet her burden

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of demonstrating that the ALJ erred by not selecting from these dates because the
ALJ’s determination that Waterhouse was not disabled until March 12, 2014 was
based on specific evidence or opinions that we cannot say were improperly
discounted.
3. The ALJ gave “specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by
substantial evidence” for discounting Dr. Layton’s opinion and giving it only “partial
weight.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Ryan v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008)). The ALJ noted
inconsistences in Dr. Layton’s treatment notes, considered the lack of temporal
scope indicated in his February 2013 letter, considered the failure to perform the
tender points test, considered the lack of objective medical evidence to establish a
fibromyalgia diagnosis, and considered how Dr. Layton’s diagnosis was inconsistent
with Waterhouse’s daily activities.
4. The ALJ provided “specific, clear and convincing reasons” for
discounting Waterhouse’s own testimony about her symptoms and limitations.
Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 678 (quoting Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014-15). These reasons
included inconsistencies both between Waterhouse’s testimony and her activities
and within her own testimony, Waterhouse’s refusal of medical treatments, and
records indicating that her symptoms improved with medication. See Molina v.
Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing how the ALJ may assess

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claimant testimony).
5. Waterhouse also challenges the ALJ’s discounting of opinions by non-
physician health care providers, including Mr. Myers (physician assistant), Ms.
Hensley (mental health therapist), and Ms. Fields (nurse practitioner). The reasons
that the ALJ provided to discount the opinions of these non-physician providers were
at least “germane,” see Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111, and included inconsistencies
between reports of Waterhouse’s activities and treatment notes and contradictions
with other medical evidence. See Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th
Cir. 2015) (reiterating that it is within the ALJ’s province to resolve conflicts in the
testimony and ambiguities in the record).
6. The ALJ provided “germane” reasons for discounting testimony of lay
witnesses—Waterhouse’s mother and Rebecca Morey of the state Division of
Vocational Rehabilitation—regarding Waterhouse’s symptoms and limitations. See
Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 1993). These reasons included the fact
that Ms. Morey did not personally examine Waterhouse or review her medical
records, and inconsistencies between the witnesses’ testimony and other specified
aspects of the record. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 510-12 (9th Cir. 2001).
7. Because substantial evidence supports the ALJ's evidentiary
conclusions and credibility determinations, we likewise conclude the ALJ
appropriately evaluated Waterhouse's Residual Functional Capacity and

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appropriately conducted the Step Five analysis.
8. The ALJ’s review of the record in this case—including Waterhouse’s
in-person testimony before her—led her to conclude that Waterhouse was disabled
as of March 12, 2014. Waterhouse bore the burden of establishing an earlier
disability onset date. Our review of the ALJ’s decision satisfies us that the ALJ
provided legally sufficient reasons for coming to her conclusion, and the District
Court did not err in affirming her decision that Waterhouse was not disabled until
March 12, 2014. Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is
AFFIRMED.

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