United States of America v. GREGORY VILLEGAS, AKA Jacob Bailey, AKA Ray Mathis, AKA Ray Matsui, AKA Thomas…

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
GREGORY VILLEGAS, AKA Jacob
Bailey, AKA Ray Mathis, AKA Ray Matsui,
AKA Thomas Rasmus, AKA John Thames,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 17-10300
D.C. No.
2:13-cr-00355-GMN-CWH-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Gloria M. Navarro, Chief Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 19, 2018
San Francisco, California
Before: GOULD and BERZON, Circuit Judges, and BLOCK,** District Judge.
Defendant Gregory Villegas and his codefendants were indicted for their
involvement in a telemarketing fraud scheme. Villegas pleaded guilty. He agreed,
among other things, to waive any challenge or defense to an order of forfeiture.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The Honorable Frederic Block, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
FILED
JAN 7 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Villegas also agreed that $5,261,218 was derived from proceeds traceable to the
offense.
Before his sentencing, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Honeycutt v.
United States, 137 S. Ct. 1626 (2017), which held that joint and several forfeiture
was not permitted under statutory provisions similar to those at issue in this case.
The parties did not raise an issue of application of the specific precedent of
Honeycutt at sentencing in this case, perhaps because it was handed down shortly
before the sentencing proceeding here. It is unclear from the “Final Order in a
Criminal Case,” which was entered to resolve this case, whether the forfeiture in
Villegas’s case was intended to be “joint and several” with his codefendants.
Villegas appealed his sentence. He argues that it violates Honeycutt. We
conclude that Villegas has not waived this challenge, because it is a challenge to a
purported illegal sentence that Villegas did not specifically waive. See United
States v. Bibler, 495 F.3d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Pollard, 850
F.3d 1038, 1045 (9th Cir. 2017). But because the parties did not raise Honeycutt in
the district court, the record is wholly undeveloped as to whether and how the
Honeycutt precedent might properly apply.
We therefore VACATE the sentence as to forfeiture only and REMAND for
the district court to assess the forfeiture order in light of Honeycutt.
SENTENCE VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED.

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