ZURI SANA KABISA YOUNG, AKA Zuri S.K. Young, AKA Zuri Sanakabis Young v. M. VOONG, Chief of Appeals;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ZURI SANA KABISA YOUNG, AKA Zuri
S.K. Young, AKA Zuri Sanakabis Young,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
M. VOONG, Chief of Appeals; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 18-15526
D.C. No. 1:17-cv-01671-LJO-SAB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Lawrence J. O’Neill, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 12, 2018**
Before: LEAVY, HAWKINS, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Zuri Sana Kabisa Young, AKA Zuri S.K. Young,
AKA Zuri Sanakabis Young appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
SEP 19 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d
1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Young’s due process claim arising
from the confiscation of his personal property because Young had an adequate
postdeprivation remedy under California law. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.
517, 533 (1984) (“[A]n unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state
employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation
remedy for the loss is available.”); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th
Cir. 1994) (“California [l]aw provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy for any
property deprivations.”).
The district court properly dismissed Young’s due process claim arising
from the treatment of his prison appeals because Young “lack[s] a separate
constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure.” Ramirez v.
Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003).
The district court properly dismissed Young’s retaliation and conspiracy
claims because Young failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim.
See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se
pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a
plausible claim); Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005)

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(elements of a retaliation claim in the prison context); Cassettari v. Nevada
County, Cal., 824 F.2d 735, 739-40 (9th Cir. 1987) (insufficiency of allegations to
support a § 1983 violation precludes a conspiracy claim predicated upon the same
allegations); see also Buckey v. County of Los Angeles, 968 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir.
1992) (plaintiff must allege “specific facts to support the existence of a conspiracy
among the defendants”).
We reject as without merit Young’s contention that the district court acted
unlawfully by dismissing the action after granting in forma pauperis status.
We do not consider issues or arguments not specifically and distinctly raised
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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