United States of America v. Louis Matthews

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
LOUIS MATTHEWS,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 17-10057
D.C. No.
2:15-cr-00062-JCM-CWH-2
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
James C. Mahan, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted January 10, 2018
San Francisco, California
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and RAWLINSON and WATFORD, Circuit
Judges.
Louis Matthews appeals his jury conviction for violations of 21 U.S.C. §§
841, 846, 924(c), and 924(j). We have jurisdiction over this appeal, 28 U.S.C. §
1291, and reverse his convictions and vacate his sentence.
FILED
JAN 19 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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The district court violated Matthews’ Sixth Amendment right to a
unanimous verdict by an impartial jury when it dismissed the lone holdout juror. A
district court can dismiss a juror after deliberations begin for “good cause.” Fed.
R. Crim. P. 23(b)(3). When applying this review standard, we must “safeguard[ ]
the defendant’s [Sixth Amendment] right to a unanimous verdict from an impartial
jury.” United States v. Symington, 195 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 1999). Reversal
is required if a district court dismisses the juror and “the record evidence discloses
any reasonable possibility that the impetus for [the] juror’s dismissal stems from
the juror’s views on the merits of the case.” Id.
The jury in this case announced it had reached a unanimous verdict.
However, polling of the jury in open court revealed an 11–1 split with Juror No. 8
as the lone holdout. The jury then continued deliberations. Later that day, the
judge informed counsel that Juror No. 8 left the jury room and “was sobbing and
crying.” The judge recounted that he separated Juror No. 8 from the jury, and
during an off-record interview outside the presence of counsel, Juror No. 8 stated
that “[she] can’t do this.” When the judge asked Juror No. 8 if the effect of the
deliberations prevented her from continuing, she stated, “I’m very upset. . . . And
we got in there, and they were saying . . . .” The judge cut her off at this point,
noting that he could not hear about the deliberations. When Juror No. 8 stated
2

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again that she could not continue, the judge dismissed her and seated an alternate
juror in her place. Given these facts, a “reasonable possibility” exists that the
dismissal of the sole holdout juror was related to the juror’s views of the case.
Therefore, pursuant to the requirements established in Symington, we must reverse
the convictions and remand for a new trial.
Given our resolution of this case, we need not–and do not–reach any other
issue urged by the parties.
REVERSED.
3

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U.S. v. Matthews, Case No. 17-10057
Rawlinson, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I concur in the judgment of the court because the outcome is dictated by our
holding in United States v. Symington, 195 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 1999) and the
unusual facts of this case. I write separately to point out just how unusual those
facts are. It is extremely rare for a juror to disavow a unanimous verdict during a
poll of the jury. Indeed, one of the attorneys in this case informed the court that
this circumstance had never occurred before in his twenty-plus years of practicing
law. Faced with an extremely emotional juror who stated that she could not
participate any longer, and an unprecedented occurrence, the district court selected
the option that seemed most likely to allow deliberations to continue. Indeed, there
is some suggestion in the record that the judge was not even aware that the
distraught juror was the holdout juror. Nevertheless, the fact remains that under
our precedent, if there is a reasonable possibility that the juror’s dismissal stems
from the juror’s views on the case, the constitutional right to a unanimous verdict
by an impartial jury has been violated. See id. Because this extremely low
standard is met, I concur in the disposition.
FILED
JAN 19 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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