Veronica R. Hollowell; Vivian Epps v. Arizona Department of Child Safety;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
VERONICA R. HOLLOWELL; VIVIAN
EPPS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD
SAFETY; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 16-15786
D.C. No. 2:15-cv-02045-JJT
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
John Joseph Tuchi, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 15, 2017**
Before: CANBY, TROTT, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
Veronica R. Hollowell appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging violations of Hollowell’s
constitutional rights. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
NOV 20 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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novo. Lukovsky v. City and County of San Francisco., 535 F.3d 1044, 1047 (9th
Cir. 2008) (statute of limitations); Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir.
2003) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Hollowell’s claims related to a series of
Arizona state court proceedings under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because
Hollowell’s challenge constituted a forbidden “de facto appeal” of final, state court
judgments. See Noel, 341 F.3d at 1163 (“It is a forbidden de facto appeal under
Rooker-Feldman when the plaintiff in federal district court complains of a legal
wrong allegedly committed by the state court, and seeks relief from the judgment
of that court.”).
The district court properly dismissed Hollowell’s remaining claims because
Hollowell failed to file them within the applicable two-year statute of limitations.
See Lukovsky, 535 F.3d at 1048 (in § 1983 suits, federal courts use the forum
state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions; § 1983 claims accrue when
the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the
action); Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 2004)
(Arizona provides two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims). We
reject as without merit Hollowell’s contention that her action was equitably tolled

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under the “discovery rule” until she discovered she could be entitled to legal relief
for her alleged injuries.
Epps does not allege any claims on her own behalf. To the extent Epps, a
non-attorney, seeks to bring claims on behalf of Hollowell, she may not do so. See
Johns v. County of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997) (“While a non-
attorney may appear pro se on [her] own behalf, [s]he has no authority to appear as
an attorney for others than [her]self.” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)); see id. (a power of attorney does not give one authority to bring a
lawsuit on behalf of another).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
Hollowell’s motion at Docket Entry No. 23 is granted in part. The CD listed
in Docket Entry No. 15 will be returned to her. The remainder of this motion is
denied.
Hollowell and Epps’s motion to file an oversized reply brief (Docket Entry
No. 85) is granted. The Clerk shall file Hollowell and Epps’s reply brief submitted
at Docket Entry No. 83.

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All other pending motions and requests (Docket Entry Nos. 77, 78, 79, 80,
81, 82, and 88) are denied.
AFFIRMED.

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