Scott Bailey Anderson v. Cs James Jolly, Sccc;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SCOTT BAILEY ANDERSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CS JAMES JOLLY, SCCC; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 16-35623
D.C. No. 3:15-cv-05286-BHS
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Benjamin H. Settle, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 9, 2017**
Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Washington state prisoner Scott Bailey Anderson appeals pro se from the
district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
retaliation and due process claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review de novo. Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1267 (9th Cir. 2009). We
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
AUG 17 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Anderson’s
retaliation claim because Anderson failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact
as to whether there was an absence of legitimate correctional goals for defendants’
conduct. See Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[A] successful
retaliation claim requires a finding that the prison authorities’ retaliatory action did
not advance legitimate goals of the correctional institution or was not tailored
narrowly enough to achieve such goals.” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994) (preserving
institutional order and discipline are legitimate penological objectives).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Anderson’s due
process claim because Anderson did not raise a genuine dispute of material fact as
to whether his security-level reclassification and move to a different prison
implicated a protected liberty interest. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84
(1995) (holding that a constitutionally protected liberty interest arises only when a
restraint imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to
the ordinary incidents of prison life”).
AFFIRMED.

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