Ariann J-Hanna v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company of San Francisco, LLC

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ARIANN J-HANNA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ENTERPRISE RENT-A-CAR
COMPANY OF SAN FRANCISCO, LLC,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 14-15057
D.C. No. 4:10-cv-00504-CKJ
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Cindy K. Jorgenson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 14, 2016**
Before: WALLACE, LEAVY, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
Ariann J-Hanna appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment
in her diversity action alleging state law claims in connection with her purchase of
a vehicle. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo.
FILED
JAN 04 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 629 (9th Cir.
1987). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on J-Hanna’s Arizona
Consumer Fraud Act and common law fraudulent concealment claims because J-
Hanna failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Enterprise
was a party to the sale of a vehicle to J-Hanna and whether it had knowledge of
any alleged defect. See Sullivan v. Pulte Home Corp., 290 P.3d 446, 454-55 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2012) (subsequent purchasers do not have a cause of action under
Arizona’s Consumer Fraud Act against the seller in the original sales transaction;
to establish a common law fraudulent concealment claim, a plaintiff must show the
defendant was a party to a transaction with the plaintiff), vacated in part on other
grounds by, 306 P.3d 1 (Ariz. 2013).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying J-Hanna’s motions
to submit evidence because J-Hanna failed to demonstrate good cause for seeking
to submit evidence several months after the discovery deadline had passed, and J-
Hanna did not seek an extension of time to complete discovery. See Jones v.
Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir. 2004) (setting forth standard of review);
Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607-09 (9th Cir. 1992)
(party seeking modification of a scheduling order must demonstrate good cause,
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the focus of which is the diligence of the moving party).
We reject as without merit J-Hanna’s contention regarding the district
court’s grant of her motion to compel.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
We do not consider documents not presented to the district court. See
United States v. Elias, 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990).
J-Hanna’s motion to submit physical exhibits, dated May 12, 2014, is
denied.
AFFIRMED.
14-15057 3

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