Ronan Aguiar De Souza v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RONAN AGUIAR DE SOUZA,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 13-71853
Agency No. A078-258-065
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted June 6, 2016**
Pasadena, California
Before: REINHARDT and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges and BENNETT,*** Senior
District Judge.
Petitioner Ronan Aguiar De Souza (“De Souza”), a citizen of Brazil,
petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) denial of his
FILED
JUN 13 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Mark W. Bennett, Senior District Judge for the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Iowa, sitting by designation.

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motion to reopen to apply for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Although the BIA denied the motion on
multiple grounds, we need address only one because we conclude that the BIA did
not err in holding that the motion to reopen failed to establish a prima facie case for
relief. We therefore deny the petition.
1. In addition to other requirements, a motion to reopen immigration
proceedings must establish “a prima facie case for [the] relief” sought.
Tadevosyan v. Holder, 743 F.3d 1250, 1255 (9th Cir. 2014). With respect to
asylum, the relevant standard requires demonstrating that the non-citizen is “unable
or unwilling to return to his home country because of a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion.” Durate de Guinac v. INS, 179 F.3d 1156, 1159
(9th Cir. 1999).
Here, De Souza was arrested in the United States for possession of a false
visa. After his arrest, he implicated several Brazilian citizens in a visa fraud ring,
and now alleges that one of the scheme’s ringleaders has since been deported to
Brazil and intends to harm De Souza upon his return to Brazil. As the BIA
properly held, however, De Souza’s motion to reopen does not establish a prima
facie case for asylum for two reasons. First, the record is wholly devoid of any
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allegation that the Brazilian government would be “unable or unwilling” to protect
him, as required for an asylum claim. Afriyie v. Holder, 613 F.3d 924, 931 (9th
Cir. 2010). Second, De Souza cannot establish that one of the protected grounds
listed in the asylum statute is at least “a central reason” for the persecution.
Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 2009). At most, De Souza’s
allegations establish only that he fears being harmed as a result of a personal
vendetta arising out of De Souza’s cooperation with law enforcement. A personal
vendetta does not, without more, provide a sufficient basis for asylum. See
Madrigal v. Holder, 716 F.3d 499, 506 (9th Cir. 2013).
2. De Souza’s brief before this court addresses only his eligibility for
asylum. We note, however, that the remainder of his motion to reopen presents no
basis for granting relief.
Accordingly, the petition for review is
DENIED.
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