United States of America v. Richard Leonard Arlington, a.k.a. Victor Petrovch Astashoff

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RICHARD LEONARD ARLINGTON,
a.k.a. Victor Petrovch Astashoff,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 15-50327
D.C. No. 2:13-cr-00391-PSG
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Philip S. Gutierrez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 24, 2016**
Before: REINHARDT, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Richard Leonard Arlington appeals from the district court’s order modifying
the terms of his supervised to require him to participate in a GPS monitoring
program for a period not to exceed twelve months. We have jurisdiction under 28
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAY 31 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Arlington first contends that the district court lacked jurisdiction to impose
the condition because probation petitioned to add it before he was released. We
disagree. The district did not impose the condition until after Arlington’s release.
In any event, a district court may modify the conditions of supervised release “at
any time prior to the expiration or termination of the term of supervised release.”
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2).
Arlington next contends that the district court failed to explain the condition
adequately. We review for plain error, United States v. Valencia-Barragan, 608
F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010), and find none. The district court’s reasons for
imposing the condition are apparent from the record. See United States v.
Daniels, 541 F.3d 915, 924 (9th Cir. 2008).
Finally, Arlington contends that the district court erred by imposing the
condition because it is not reasonably related to the goals of supervised release and
is a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary. The district court
did not abuse its discretion. See United States v. Weber, 451 F.3d 552, 557 (9th
Cir. 2006). The condition involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is
reasonably necessary to protect the public and is reasonably related to facilitating

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Arlington’s compliance with the other conditions of his supervised release. See
18 U.S.C. § 3583(d); Weber, 451 F.3d at 557-58.
AFFIRMED.

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