Thuy Le Nguyen v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner of Social Security

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
THUY LE NGUYEN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 13-36097
D.C. No. 2:12-cv-01025-TSZ
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Thomas S. Zilly, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 2, 2016
Seattle, Washington
Before: GRABER and BERZON, Circuit Judges, and CURIEL,** District Judge.
In this social security case, Thuy Le Nguyen appeals from the district court’s
judgment affirming the agency’s finding that she did not suffer from a severe
impairment on or before her date last insured, December 31, 1997. Reviewing for
FILED
MAY 10 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The Honorable Gonzalo P. Curiel, United States District Judge for the
Southern District of California, sitting by designation.

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substantial evidence, Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097–98 (9th Cir. 1999), we
affirm.
1. To be entitled to Title II disability benefits, a claimant must establish that
her disability existed on or before the date on which her disability insurance
expired. Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1999). The claimant has
the burden of proving disability. Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir.
1984). A diagnosis, in itself, is not sufficient to establish a disability. A claimant
must show that she has a severe impairment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c).
2. Here, Dr. Diaconu submitted evidence that schizophrenia is a chronic
illness with onset in early adulthood and that Nguyen’s illness "most likely" started
before 1997. The administrative law judge ("ALJ") permissibly concluded that the
statement as to timing was speculative and did not rely on any objective evidence.
3. Nguyen testified that she experienced symptoms before 1997. The ALJ
permissibly discounted this testimony because Nguyen had earlier denied any
previous significant history of psychiatric disorder and because her husband
testified that Nguyen could competently complete some household tasks.
4. Nguyen offered lay testimony of her husband and two friends. The ALJ
permissibly concluded that Mr. Nguyen’s testimony did not establish a severe
impairment. The ALJ did not expressly consider the other lay witness testimony.
2

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Failure to discuss this testimony was harmless error because the friends’ testimony
did not add material information about the relevant time period and, so, would not
have altered the ALJ’s decision. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir.
2012).
AFFIRMED.
3

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