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14-71485•JUAN JOSE MIRANDA-GODINEZ, AKA Juan Miranda, AKA Juan Jose Miranda v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General
14-71485Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit28.04.2016
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JUAN JOSE MIRANDA-GODINEZ,
AKA Juan Miranda, AKA Juan Jose
Miranda,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 14-71485
Agency No. A036-421-357
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted April 28, 2016**
San Francisco, California
Before: PAEZ, CLIFTON, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Juan Jose Miranda-Godinez petitions for review of a decision of
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) determining that Miranda-Godinez’s
conviction for arson under California Penal Code § 451(d) was an “aggravated
FILED
APR 28 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
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felony” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). Specifically, the BIA
determined that Miranda-Godinez’s arson conviction constituted a “crime of
violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).
However, as the Attorney General concedes, our recent decision in Dimaya
v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2015), controls the outcome of this case. In
Dimaya, we adhered to the rationale articulated in Johnson v. United States, 135
S. Ct. 2551, 2558 (2015), where the Court held that the definition of a “violent
felony” in the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act was
unconstitutionally vague. We held that similar language in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), as
incorporated into 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F)’s definition of a “crime of violence,”
is also unconstitutionally vague. See Dimaya, 803 F.3d at 1111. We are bound by
this precedent, which does not support the BIA’s determination.
The petition for review is GRANTED and we REMAND to the BIA for
termination of removal proceedings.
2
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