EDWIN RITTER JONAS, III, Esquire; BLACKTAIL MOUNTAIN RANCH CO., LLC v. RONALD F. WATERMAN, Esquire;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
EDWIN RITTER JONAS, III, Esquire;
BLACKTAIL MOUNTAIN RANCH CO.,
LLC,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
RONALD F. WATERMAN, Esquire; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 13-36218
D.C. No. 9:13-cv-00016-DLC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Dana L. Christensen, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 15, 2016**
Before: GOODWIN, LEAVY, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Edwin Ritter Jonas, III, Esq., appeals pro se from the district court’s
dismissal order and summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that
a state court judge violated his constitutional rights, and that attorneys who
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAR 23 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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represented him in a prior state court case committed legal malpractice. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Szajer v. City of Los
Angeles, 632 F.3d 607, 610 (9th Cir. 2011) (summary judgment); Meek v. County
of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1999) (dismissal on the basis of judicial
immunity). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Jonas’s claims against Judge McNeil
because Judge McNeil is entitled to judicial immunity. See Ashelman v. Pope,
793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (“Judges and those performing
judge-like functions are absolutely immune from damage liability for acts
performed in their official capacities.”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment for Waterman and his
law firm because Jonas failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether he might have obtained a different result but for these defendants’ alleged
negligence. See Richards v. Knuchel, 115 P.3d 189, 192-93 (Mont. 2005) (setting
forth elements of legal malpractice claim under Montana law). To the extent that
Jonas sought review of prior state court judgments, his claims are barred by the
Rooker–Feldman doctrine. See Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855,
858-59 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The Rooker–Feldman doctrine is a well-established

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jurisdictional rule prohibiting federal courts from exercising appellate review over
final state court judgments.”).
We do not consider Jonas’s contention that the district court should have
applied judicial estoppel to prevent Waterman and his law firm from asserting res
judicata because Jonas never raised judicial estoppel before the district court. See
Int’l Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsman Local Union No. 20, AFL-CIO v.
Martin Jaska, Inc., 752 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1985).
We reject as without merit Jonas’s contention that the district court
improperly denied his evidentiary objections and failed to recognize judicially
noticeable documents.
Appellees’ motion to dismiss Blacktail Mountain Ranch Co., LLC, filed on
March 27, 2014, is granted. See Bigelow v. Ronald Brady, A&A Realty Ltd. (In re
Bigelow), 179 F.3d 1164, 1165 (9th Cir. 1999) (a business entity’s notice of appeal
signed by a non-lawyer corporate officer is valid only if a lawyer promptly enters a
formal appearance “prior to the time any briefs, motions or responses [a]re due.”).
All other outstanding motions and requests are denied.
AFFIRMED.

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